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Abstract 
The relationship between corporate performance and governance practices goes back for 
centuries yet is still relevant today, in the modern corporate environment. While corporate 
governance is argued to be an agency cost, as it curbs managers’ self-interest, it is believed 
to increase company performance as it inspires group effort from all stakeholders. Corporate 
governance describes the mechanisms in place to ensure that management is taking 
appropriate steps, policies and procedures to protect every stakeholder’s interest in the 
company. The study is an investigation on the relationship between corporate governance 
board of directors and company performance. Board of directors’ characteristics were 
represented by board size, board independence, Chief Executive Officer (CEO) tenure, CEO 
compensation and CEO duality while company performance measures were represented by 
Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Assets (ROA) and Net Profit Margin (NPM). The study 
used panel regression analysis to estimate a sample of 12 South African public companies 
in the construction and building materials sector of the Johannesburg Stock Exchange for 
the period of 2011 to 2016. The size and leverage of a company were considered as control 
variables. 
 
The findings indicated no significant relationship between board independence, board size 
and CEO duality but did find a direct significant relationship between CEO tenure and CEO 
remuneration and company performance. The research also found a statistically significant 
inverse relationship between leverage and company size and performance of the company. 
 
This research is a useful aid to the comprehension of board characteristics affecting 
company performance in South Africa and improving corporate governance principles to 
eliminate corporate scandals that are crippling economies globally. 
 
Key words 
Corporate governance, governing body, corporate performance, agency theory, corporate 
board of directors, JSE, panel data analysis, shareholder, stakeholder.  
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Chapter 1  Overview and background of the research 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
“Whilst management processes have been widely explored, relatively little attention has 
been paid to the processes by which companies are governed. If management is about 
running businesses, governance is about seeing that it is run properly. All companies need 
governing as well as managing”. 
 
This was quoted by an American economist, Tricker (1984), articulating the need to 
continuously develop and improve corporate governance processes. Smit (2015) pointed out 
that, in order to advance and sustain the economy, the practise of good governance is 
increasingly becoming not only an ethical issue but an essential component of every 
contemporary business both globally and in South Africa. 
 
The diffusion and dilution of ownership in contemporary organisations has continued to 
increase, “leading to the separation of ownership and control” as organisations are now 
being controlled and managed by individuals who do not own them (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976:306). However, the main problem currently facing dispersed shareholders is the ability 
to act jointly “to influence managers to act in the best interest of the shareholders” (Akeem, 
Terer, Kiyanjui & Kayode, 2014:43). This creates an opening for managers, allowing them 
“to pursue their own interests instead of those of shareholders and stakeholders” (Hermalin 
& Weisbach, 1991:105). This context underpins the seminal study by Berle and Means 
(1932) who first developed the theory on agency costs. It is from the agency theory that the 
notion of corporate governance originated, taking into account “the principal-agent 
relationship as a key element in determining company performance” (Waweru, 2014:458). 
 
Corporate governance issues gained prominence globally subsequent to the financial crisis 
of the 1990s and the rise in corporate fraud and corporate failure of high-profile companies 
worldwide (Abid, Ahmed & Ahmed, 2018). More recently, the worldwide economic crisis of 
2007 to 2008 may also be a result of deficiencies in corporate governance in financial 
institutions (Kirkpatrick, 2009; Tshipa, Brummer, Wolmarans & Du Toit, 2018b). Managerial 
delinquency and carelessness, lack of direction, corporate scams and enormous forfeiture of 
shareholders wealth has been at the core of these corporate failures. As a result, there has 
been intensified scrutiny of corporate governance issues, with special emphasis on the 
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board structures and characteristics. As a result, corporate financiers have lost certitude and 
trust in investing funds as this state of affairs casts doubt on the usefulness of corporate 
governance, and predominantly, the board’s ability to lead and direct companies. 
 
Against this backdrop, there has been increased promulgation of corporate governance 
reports globally in order to prevent the reoccurrence of corporate failures and to regain 
investors’ trust (Haruna, Kwambo & Hassan, 2018). Broad recognition of corporate 
governance practices and developments is a fundamental component in reinforcing lasting 
economic growth and financial performance of companies. 
 
Corporate governance aims to safeguard investor’s capital investments by ensuring a 
sustainable yield on their investments. Financial performance assessment is thus a key 
element of sound corporate governance. The study is an examination of the relationship 
between board characteristics and financial performance within the context of South African 
public companies in the construction and building materials sector of the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange during the period 2011 to 2016.  
  
1.2 BACKGROUND 
The corporate governance concept was evoked from the agency problem which originated 
from the split amid owners and those who control the companies. In this view, corporate 
governance is the foundation of reliability, transparency, accountability and clarity in the way 
a company operates (Budiarso, Mandey & Karamoy, 2018; Anandasayanan & 
Thirunavukkarasu, 2018). It fosters trust and instils confidence in the various stakeholders of 
a company. In support of the above view, in South Africa Mans-Kemp and Viviers (2015) 
point out that the main purpose of corporate governance is to curb agency problems, as 
described in agency theory, as the interest of shareholders and management are not always 
in tandem.  
 
The application of good governance practises is the foundation of ethical leadership and the 
outcome is well-run corporations with sustainable earnings. This ensures the achievement of 
the lasting objectives of a company and maximises value creation and goodwill of the 
company. Moreover, the practice of good corporate governance is vital to any organisation, 
both for growth and survival. Boshkoska (2014) concurs, noting that a system of good 
corporate governance may increase company performance by opening doors for external 
funding. In a similar vein, the Global Investor Opinion Survey states that investors are highly 
probable to finance businesses that are well governed, where their safety and protection is 
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perceived to be guaranteed (McKinsey & Company, 2002).  More so, Muniandy and Hillier 
(2015) believe that good governance attracts foreign investment, which promotes financial 
stability and business growth. Therefore, South African companies have to continuously take 
stock of their compliance with corporate governance principles in order to attract foreign 
investment. 
 
Internal mechanisms of corporate governance refer to the customs, approaches and 
procedures used by companies in creating value for shareholders while external governance 
refers to control over companies that is exerted from the outside such as market factors, 
suppliers, goods and services prevailing in the market (Muniandy & Hillier, 2015; Schymik, 
2018). Some of these internal mechanisms include ownership structure, the governing body 
structures, board committees and company auditors (Ahmadi, Nakaa & Bouri, 2018). 
Moreover, other external factors such as the state and the judiciary, not only exercise 
external control over company operations but also create rules that safeguard all 
stakeholders and prevent corporate failure due to misconducts (Schymik, 2018). All of these 
factors combine to form the landscape of broad corporate governance. 
 
Every company needs resources to attain its objectives; the practice of good corporate 
governance builds the reputation of companies with stakeholders, thereby assisting them to 
obtain the resources and backing they need from stakeholders to increase performance (Su 
& Sauerwald, 2018). However, the same authors maintain that the introduction of stringent 
governance principles is the cause of poor performance in companies due to the increased 
cost of governance. In line with this view Boshkoska (2014) viewed corporate governance as 
an agency cost as it diminishes company resources on societal well-being that adds little to 
company performance. However, these contradictory views lead to the question whether the 
board, as the custodian of control and direction of the company, is applying corporate 
governance practices for its own benefit or for that of the company. Conheady, Mcllkenny, 
Opong and Pignatel (2015) point out that the way to counter agency theory and its self-
serving interest is by having an effective board in the modern corporation. However, the 
most significant problem for corporations has been to strike a balance between good 
performance and compliance with good practices of corporate governance. 
 
Accordingly, Ayari and Regaieg (2018) point to corporate board characteristics and their 
structures as an important factor in corporate governance. Zakaria, Purhanudin and 
Palanimally (2014) emphasise that the attributes of the board such as size, independence, 
CEO duality, CEO remuneration and CEO tenure are a key element of a board’s success or 
failure.  The board of directors needs to be structured in such a way that it adds value to the 
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company. Getting the right board in place is therefore the key to good governance 
(Conheady et al., 2015). The third King Report elucidates that “the board’s paramount 
responsibility is the positive performance of the company in creating value by appropriately 
considering the legitimate interests and expectations of all its stakeholders” (King Report III, 
2009:29).The board of directors offers overall leadership and acts as the central point and 
direction from which important strategic decisions are made towards the accomplishment of 
a company’s objectives by creating value for stakeholders (King Report III, 2009; Padachi, 
Ramsurrun & Ramen, 2018). Consequently, the board of directors has been held 
accountable for diminishing shareholder returns worldwide, especially in developing 
countries like South Africa. 
 
Subsequent to the global economic crisis of 2007 to 2008 and the frequent occurrence of 
corporate failure, coupled with corporate racketeering, managerial negligence, misconduct 
and loss of shareholders’ wealth, concerns has  been raised about the usefulness and 
adequacy of corporate governance standards and practices in promoting company 
performance (Krechovská & Procházková, 2014). Smit (2015) holds the view that corporate 
calamities, as evidenced by the demise of companies in recent years, have led to the 
resurgence of corporate governance worldwide. The fall of Enron, Adelphia, Tyco 
International, Arthur Anderson and WorldCom (United States of America), HIH Insurance 
(Australia), Marconi (United Kingdom), the Royal Ahold (Netherlands), Satyam (India) and 
Parmalat (Italy) are examples of international corporate collapses that have dented 
stakeholders’ confidence in companies and in the usefulness of current corporate 
governance practices in promoting transparency and accountability.  
 
Mansur and Tangl (2018) thus maintain that the spike in the financial scandals in developed 
nations has led to the introduction of legislation that facilitated the promulgation of corporate 
governance codes. Notable examples are in United States of America and the United 
Kingdom  in the form of  the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the 1992 Cadbury Report. The 
scandals of recent years are confirmation of ineffective and deficient governance monitoring 
mechanisms as well as the failure of boards to direct companies. However, the lessons 
learnt from these international corporate failures has been phenomenal and have highlighted  
the role of corporate governance in supporting companies and safeguarding the 
stakeholders’ interests (Paul & Sy, 2015). 
 
South Africa is no exception to corporate failures. Major examples include Siemens, African 
Bank, LeisureNet, Fidentia, JCI-Randgold, Regal Treasury Bank, Steinhoff, Naspers, KPMG 
and McKinsey (refer to Chapter 2 section 2.4.4). These failures have led to the enhancement 
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of corporate governance standards and practices in the form of the King Reports (Tshipa & 
Mokoaleli-Mokoteli; 2015; Smit, 2015). Recently South Africa has made headlines 
dominated by corporate mishaps. Since the inception of the JSE, the fall of Steinhoff is one 
of the most prominent failures in South Africa (Ben, 2017). Moreover, a number of 
companies connected to the ‘state capture’ by the Gupta family-linked companies have been 
the focus of attention, centred on the Gupta family’s close ties to former South African 
president Jacob Zuma (Wolf, 2017; Bhorat, Buthelezi, Chipkin, Duma, Mondi, Peter & 
Swilling, 2017).  
 
However, corporate governance in South Africa has received positive attention since the 
promulgation of the first King Report and Code of Corporate Governance which was 
published by the Institute of Directors in Southern Africa in 1994 (Smit, 2015). Several 
iterations of the report have followed with King II, King III and King IV of the King Report on 
Corporate Governance and the King Code of Corporate Governance being issued in 2002, 
2009 and 2016 respectively. The issue of these reports facilitated the introduction and 
practice of good corporate governance mechanisms in South African companies (Tshipa et 
al., 2018b). Since then, companies have been restructuring their operations and activities, 
particularly their governance structures. However, these reports are not regulated by law, 
thus they merely provide recommendations for ‘good’ practices. Nonetheless the 
Johannesburg Stock Exchange has made it a listing requirement to comply with 
recommendations by King III report and code on governance.  
 
According to African Corporate Governance Network (2016), the JSE is arguably the most 
advanced stock market in Southern Africa and ranks in the world’s best twenty stock 
markets based on gross revenue. The choice of the South African stock exchange has been 
influenced by the requirements of King III Code on Corporate Governance which must be 
complied with as a listing requirement for companies on JSE. Moreover, Ararat, Black and 
Yurtoglu (2017) maintain that emerging markets like South Africa have specific governance 
issues, different to those in developed markets, which is why South Africa was chosen for 
the study.  
 
Although the South African construction and building materials sector remains under 
tremendous pressure from the general global and local economic melt-down it is a key 
sector for economic growth and infrastructure development. During times of economic 
hardships when the companies are faced with greatest challenges, they require effective 
leadership skills to think projects through, change strategies to meet changing conditions 
and remain focused on the end goal. This research aims to highlight and identify the 
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corporate governance leadership elements in the construction and building materials sector 
that has a significant relationship with company performance. The research becomes crucial 
in identifying corporate governance factors that could be applied aggressively in current 
practices to revive, sustain and successfully lead the sector during difficult times. 
 
The construction and building materials sector is the third largest contributor to South African 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) despite the sector facing tremendous pressures. In 2016 
South Africa was ranked third largest economy in Africa in terms of GDP 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016). The South African construction sector has been crucial in 
sustaining employments rates by employing more than 1.4 million people (Crampton, 2016). 
The growth of the construction and building materials sector (both in quantity and property 
appreciation rates) in South Africa provides an opportunity to analyse if the characteristics of 
corporate governance bodies have any influence on performance in the sector 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2016). The South African National development plan is also 
dedicated to the continuous improvement of the construction and building materials sector 
through its continued commitment to public infrastructure investment. According to Njobeni 
(2019), the construction and building materials sector is set to improve in 2019 at a steady 
growth of 2.4% based on research done by credit rating agency Fitch Solutions. 
 
This research tests the application of internal governance principles, as represented by the 
characteristics of the board of directors. The study casts light on the extent to which board 
characteristics, influences financial performance within the construction and building 
materials sector of South African companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. 
 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT  
The problem is the diffusion and dilution of equity ownership of listed companies which has 
seen more and more “separation of ownership and control” (Ferreira, Ornelas & Turner 
2015:1). The managers who have been assigned the responsibility of directing companies 
on behalf of owners have the potential to serve their own interests instead of those of 
shareholders and other stakeholders (Akeem et al., 2014). This state of affairs has led to an 
increase in agency costs and significant effects on company performance.  
 
More so, constraints emanating from lack of good governance practices have been the key 
factor affecting company performance in emerging countries such as South Africa (Ntim, 
2013). According to Tshipa and Mokoaleli-Mokoteli (2015) it is highly likely that this has led 
to the corporate collapses in the country. Existing corporate governance principles have 
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therefore been blamed for failing to curb the behaviour of managers, particularly given the 
frequency with which board received inverse attention for negligence in their responsibilities 
(Tshipa et al., 2018a). 
 
Furthermore, in the South African context of JSE listed companies, the relationship between 
the characteristics of the board and company performance has never been examined before 
from the perspective of the construction and building materials sector. The greater part of 
research on corporate governance and company performance was conducted in advanced 
nations (Dzingai & Fakoya, 2017). The findings of most of these studies were generally 
mixed and lacking in consistency (Afrifa & Tauringana, 2015). This is also the case for the 
handful of similar studies conducted in South Africa, refer to section 2.6 for studies by 
Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005), Chen, Chen and Wei (2009), Ntim (2013), 
Meyer and De Wet (2013), Waweru (2014), Tshipa and Mokoaleli-Mokoteli (2015), Mans-
Kemp and Viviers (2015), Muniandy and Hillier (2015), Pamburai, Chamisa, Abdulla and 
Smith (2015), Smit  (2015), Taljaard, Ward and Muller (2015), Muchemwa, Padia and 
Callaghan (2016), Dzingai and Fakoya (2017) and  Tshipa et al. (2018abc). A gap has 
therefore been identified in the relationship between the board characteristics and company 
performance in South Africa. This study explores this relationship, thereby contributing to the 
pool of research on this topic. 
1.4 RESEARCH QUESTION 
The main research question is: 
→ Is there any relationship between corporate governance, as represented by 
characteristics of boards of directors, and the financial performance of public 
companies on the construction and building materials sector of JSE in South Africa? 
The following sub-questions will assist in unpacking the key research question step by step 
▪ Is there a relationship between the proportion of independent, non-salaried directors 
on the board and company performance? 
▪ Is there a relationship between board size and company performance? 
▪ Is there a relationship between CEO duality roles and company performance? 
▪ Is there a relationship between CEO tenure and company performance? 
▪ Is there a relationship between company CEO remuneration and company 
performance? 
 
For control purposes the following specific questions are posed: 
▪ Is there a relationship between the company’s leverage and company performance? 
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▪ Is there a relationship between size of the company and company performance? 
 
1.5 RESEARCH OBJECTIVE  
The objective of the research is: 
▪ To examine, through empirical evidence, the relationship between the level of 
compliance of the corporate governance board characteristics and the financial 
performance of South African, public companies in the construction and building 
materials sector of the JSE. 
The study thus investigates whether board characteristics (as represented by size, 
independence, CEO tenure, CEO duality and CEO compensation) have any relationship with 
company performance (as represented by net profit margin, return on assets and return on 
equity), and if so, which characteristics have a significant relationship with the performance 
of the companies. 
 
In order to achieve the research objective above, the study examines whether corporate 
governance board characteristics can stimulate the financial performance of companies 
listed on the JSE in the construction and building materials sector. 
 
1.6 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this research is to explore the results of prior literature on the relationship 
between board characteristics and company financial performance. This research resolve is 
filling the gap by concentrating on the context of South African companies, particularly those 
in the construction and building materials sector. This sector has not been thoroughly 
investigated in the area of corporate governance, as denoted by board characteristics 
relationship to company performance. The findings on related research topics have proven 
inconsistent both in developed and emerging countries. Knowledge of the construction and 
buildings materials sector, which is the third largest contributor to GDP in South Africa, is an 
important topic for investors. 
 
1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The study followed a quantitative approach due to the measurable nature of the data. This 
approach has been previously adopted by Padachi et al. (2018) and Tshipa et al. (2018b). 
The collection and examination of quantitative data facilitated the adoption of a positivism 
paradigm in determining the relationship between data sets. 
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 Research instrument 
This research involves the use of a panel data linear regression model by means of e-Views 
9.5 software. In determining the relationship between board characteristics and company 
performance panel regression analysis has been extensively applied. Similar studies that 
used this statistical method in emerging markets include Waweru (2014), Dzingai and 
Fakoya (2017), Haruna et al. (2018), Padachi et al. (2018) and Tshipa et al. (2018b). 
 
To ensure the reliability of results, panel data analysis is the preferred method of estimation 
because it allows for wider data file and increases the number of observations. In this study, 
this was because the research period only spans six years by facilitating cross-sectional time 
series examination (Akeem et al., 2014). Moreover, panel data analysis is preferable 
because of its capacity "to control for heterogeneity and endogeneity issues” (Akeem et al., 
2014:48). 
1.7.2 Data collection and analysis 
1.7.3 Data collection 
The research data was extracted from the audited annual reports available on company 
websites or the JSE website during the period of study 2011 to 2016. The analysis is 
conducted with reference to King III. The choice of the study period is dependent on the 
years during which King III was in effect since the board characteristics used as proxy for 
corporate governance are defined by King III.  Selection of data from audited annual reports 
ensures reliability of the data as it is confirmable and conforms to IFRS (International 
Financial Reporting Standards). 
 
1.7.3.1 Secondary data analysis 
Secondary data analysis refers to the breakdown of the data contained in the annual reports. 
This data was not originally gathered by the researcher; instead, only data related to the 
study variables was selected. Secondary data analysis involves thoroughly and cautiously 
sifting through the annual reports to find data that can be collected directly from the annual 
reports or recalculated from the annual reports. This is done by means of financial ratios for 
use as study variables insofar as the data applies to the study. 
 
1.7.3.2 Sampling method 
The study uses a non-probability convenience sampling method to select a sample for 
testing from 12 listed South African companies in the construction and building materials 
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sector. Convenience sampling was preferred to facilitate proximity and accessibility of 
secondary data during the period of study. This sampling method is consistent with previous 
studies done by Meyer and De Wet (2013) and Purag, Abdullah and Bujang (2016). 
  
1.7.3.3 Data variables 
To determine the relationship between corporate governance and company performance, 
the study used return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and net profit margin (NPM) 
as the dependent variables, board independence, board size, CEO tenure, CEO duality 
and CEO remuneration as independent variables whilst company size and level of leverage 
as control variables.  
 
1.8 LIMITATIONS 
▪ Although all data was from reliable, audited integrated reports, any mistake or 
miscalculation in these secondary sources could unavoidably be carried over in the 
research sample.  
▪ The exploration was restricted to public companies in the construction and building 
materials sector of the JSE. 
▪ The research focused on board characteristics such as size and leverage of company as 
variables to ascertain any association with company performance. Thus, not all factors 
that affect company performance were taken into consideration in this research. There is 
several company-level (strategy) and socioeconomic (network and social environment) 
factors that also affect company performance.  
 
1.9 CHAPTER OUTLINE 
Apart from introduction, reference and appendix, the research comprises five chapters. The 
topmost chapter covers the overall view by providing the basis on which the research is 
founded. It describes the background information, statement of the problem derived from 
literature, research objective, research questions, definitions and limitations. 
 
The second chapter covers a detailed analysis on both theoretical and empirical literature. 
It is split into different parts. The first part briefly outlines the conceptual and theoretical 
framework as well as the history of the topic. The second part analyses the relevant 
empirical studies. This chapter aims at identifying a gap in prior research. 
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The third chapter outlines the overall blueprint of the research, giving details of the research 
methodology used to achieve the research purposes. It provides a detailed discussion 
and motivation for selected variables, research design, data collection and data analysis 
techniques employed. 
 
The fourth chapter presents the analysis of the results, discussing and reporting on the 
results observed from the empirical analysis. The last chapter concludes the research by 
discussing how the research question was answered and the research objective achieved 
after conclusion. It includes a summary of the research outcomes, the significance of the 
contribution and recommendations for further study.  
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Chapter 2  Literature review 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter is an exploration of empirical, historical and theoretical literature on the 
relationship between board characteristics and company performance of South African 
public companies in the construction and building materials sector of the JSE. It reviews 
previous studies that relate to the present study, to detect any gaps in literature studies. 
2.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
The objective of any company is to create wealth for stakeholders. Therefore, the main 
question of this study is whether board structures affect the way companies perform. Is there 
any relationship between corporate governance as represented by boards and the financial 
performance of companies? To answer these questions financial managers need to 
understand the role that the board of directors plays in helping a company to achieve better 
performance. This section will explain the definitions of corporate governance, its instrument 
as represented by the board and financial performance. 
 Defining corporate governance 
According to Paul and Sy (2015), there is no general consensus on what corporate 
governance means due to diversity of corporate governance practices in different countries 
around the world. Zalewska (2014) holds a similar view, confirming the absence of a 
universal meaning of corporate governance. This is due to historical diversity in political, 
religious, cultural, legal and moral settings in which companies are run and monitored in 
different countries. 
  
Despite the lack of a unanimous definition of corporate governance, researchers have 
classified corporate governance as either ‘narrow’ or ‘broad’ (Ntim, 2013). The narrow 
corporate governance structure is sometimes defined as the ‘shareholding’ corporate 
governance since its primary responsibility and accountability is to shareholders. Thus, it 
looks mainly at the internal environment. The broad definition is referred to as ‘stakeholding’ 
corporate governance since its responsibility and accountability is to a broader set of 
stakeholders that are found in both the internal and external environment (West, 2006). The 
corporate governance views evolve from the legal origins of their respective countries of 
origin. The shareholding or narrow view originated from Anglo-American countries where 
common law originates like the USA. The broader or the stakeholding view is generally 
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practised in European and Asian countries where civil law originates like the UK and 
Germany (Ntim, 2013). 
 
The Cadbury Report of 1992 which was initiated by the British government explained 
corporate governance narrowly as “a system by which companies are directed and 
controlled” (Paul & Sy, 2015:154). Mansur and Tangl (2018) in Jordan extended the Cadbury 
definition further by stating that corporate governance inculcates ethical values, company 
integrity, good reputation and best practices to manage companies to meet their objectives 
and maximise shareholders’ wealth. Moreover, corporate governance has been narrowly 
defined as “processes to ensure that companies are run well, and shareholders receive a 
reasonable return on their investments” (Budiarso et al., 2018:14). Similarly, Zalewska 
(2014) in the UK viewed corporate governance as a process by which management and 
leadership are enhanced through the moral values of fairness, accountability, responsibility 
and transparency. Furthermore, Fadun (2017) in Nigeria supports the above view by defining 
corporate governance as a tool that fosters risk management that enhances company 
performance and protect shareholders’ interest. 
 
The definitions above concur that the responsibility for corporate governance ultimately lies 
with the board of directors. The narrow view sees companies as merely a supplement of the 
shareholders with the aim of maximising shareholder wealth. Therefore, the company’s 
primary responsibility and accountability is to its shareholders who have the power to appoint 
directors to ensure that the best corporate governance mechanisms are applied. 
 
According to Tshipa and Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, (2015), there has been pressure on directors to 
not only to perform in favour of their shareholders but to consider the interest of all 
stakeholders, hence the introduction of the ‘broader’ meaning of corporate governance. The 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (2004:12) ‘broadly’ describes 
corporate governance as a “set of relationships between the management, board, 
shareholders and other stakeholders of a company”. In a similar view, in 2007 the Malaysian 
Securities Commission explained corporate governance as a process and mechanisms that 
ensures the achievement of the long-term goals of a company and maximises value creation 
for shareholders and the needs of other stakeholders (Arsad, Said, Yusoff, & Ahmad, 2018; 
Zabri, Ahmad & Wah, 2016).  
 
In support of the above view, the Institute for Corporate Governance in Indonesia described 
corporate governance as: 
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 “… a set of rules that define the relationship between shareholders, managers, 
creditors, the government, employees and other internal and external stakeholders 
in respect to their rights and responsibilities, or the system by which companies are 
directed and controlled. The objective of corporate governance is to create added 
value for the stakeholders” (Halimatusadiah, Sofianty & Ermaya, 2015:21). 
 
The broader view points out that corporate governance surpasses internal governance 
systems and incorporates “external corporate governance systems that may include the 
legal system, the market, regulators, local communities, cultural, political, social and 
economic policies, and societies within which companies’ function” (Ntim 2009:32). 
 
The recent King IV Report (2016:43) ascribes to the broader view by requiring “that 
members of the governing body must act in good faith and in the interest of the 
organisation”. According to this view, the ‘company’ includes all stakeholders; this is known 
as social responsibility. In South Africa, there is some legislation, for example, labour 
relations acts or Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (B-BBEE) Codes of Good 
Practice that compel the governing body to act in favour of certain stakeholders. However, 
such legislation creates pressure on the board to create value for the company. The 
development of research and innovation through company operations is facilitated by good 
governance through governing body structures (Detthamrong, Chancharat & Vithessonthi, 
2017). 
 
The King Reports’ (broader) meaning will be applied in this study although the King Reports 
in South Africa did adopt some of its principles from the Cadbury Report which follow the 
‘narrow’ view. 
 
 Corporate governance instrument: the board of directors. 
Schymik (2018) defines the board as the ‘backbone’ of the business. According to Mehrotra 
and Mohanty (2018), the board provides the overall direction for the company, controlling the 
roles of hiring, dismissal and monitoring of management as well as facilitating access to 
resources. The board sets the guidelines of authority and governance within the company. 
The board is nominated and selected by the shareholders and is the overall decision maker 
of issues that affect the company by providing strategic supervision and direction and 
ensures the company’s objectives support shareholders’ interest (Padachi et al., 2018). 
 
According to the Company’s Act of 2008, the board of directors is legally answerable for the 
resolutions they make on behalf of their companies. Arsad et al. (2018) define the board as a 
15 
 
group of people who make important decisions about the future direction of organisations 
and also play a critical role in maximising the shareholders’ wealth as well as other 
stakeholders’ interests. 
 
Smit (2015) notes that the business affairs of a company are managed under the direction of 
the board of directors; that delegate to the CEO and other management staff the day to day 
affairs of the company. There are three types of directors: internal, external and 
independent. Internal directors work within the company, external directors work from 
outside the business, serving on several boards, while independent directors are external 
directors with no direct or indirect relationship with the company whatsoever. 
 
To ensure that the board is effective, its structure must comply with the principles 
recommend by King III. 
 
Duties of the board of directors 
 
Abdullah (2016) indicates that the board has a dual role in implementing and maintaining 
effective leadership and control of the company. The board of directors is accountable 
legally for the decisions it makes on behalf of the company. At the time of auditing, they are 
accountable for the financial information provided concerning the company (South African 
Companies Act, 2008). 
 
The board has four main roles, namely, resource dependency, stewardship, the agency 
theory and stakeholder theory. While the agency theory identifies the role of the board as the 
‘watch dog’ of shareholders who monitor management activities, the resource dependency 
theory sees the board’s role as providing valuable external resources (Meyer & De Wet, 
2013).The stakeholder theory considers the board’s main duty to be taking into account the 
interest of groups of individuals or organisations that can affect or are affected by the 
company in the pursuit of its goals. Lastly the shareholder theory posits the board’s function 
as the preservation of shareholder yields from their investments. 
 Financial performance as the ultimate goal of corporate governance 
According to the King Report IV (2016:29), the governing body’s main role ‘‘is the positive 
performance of the company in creating value’’. This explains good performance as the 
ultimate goal of corporate governance. 
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Corporate financial performance, according to Azutoru, Obinne and Chinelo (2017:95) refers 
“to the manner in which the financial resources of a company are used to achieve overall 
company objectives”. It keeps the company in business and generates future prospects. 
Similarly, Halimatusadiah et al. (2015) view financial performance as the extent to which the 
company has succeeded in making a profit and meeting its objectives. Michelberger (2016) 
uses three metrics to evaluate corporate performance, namely, profitability, return on equity 
and market success. Accordingly, he reports a positive association between well-governed 
companies and company performance. 
 
This study has identified two functions of financial performance. The company’s long-lasting 
purpose is the maximisation of investors’ wealth whilst its temporary purpose is profit 
maximisation. The proponents of shareholders’ wealth maximisation believe the role of 
financial managers is primarily to increase shareholders’ wealth. This can be attained by 
improving the fair value of shares. Shareholders expect a return on the capital invested 
without undue risk exposure. However, the managers’ interests are not always in tandem 
with the shareholders interest and as such, managers may artificially keep the share value 
high just to maintain the shareholders’ returns. As a result, the share value of a company 
can then be enhanced, while investors’ wealth is concurrently being undermined. Thus, 
financial managers’ decisions and their insights for future performance have a substantial 
effect on investors’ wealth. 
 
The first King Report pointed out profitability maximisation as a significant element of 
compliance with corporate governance. The King Report proponents argued that there may 
not be any stakeholders with a lasting interest in a company without profit maximisation 
(King Report I, 1994). According to the stockholder theory of Milton Friedman, increasing 
profits for stockholders is the company’s only social responsibility as long as the company is 
operating within the ethical boundaries. Friedman purports that the essence of a free society 
is challenged when companies chase other goals other than maximisation of company profit. 
According to an accounting viewpoint, profit maximisation is the ultimate company goal since 
“profit is essential for the survival and lasting prosperity of a company” (Mans-Kemp, 
2014:23).  
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2.3 HISTORY OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE.  
 Corporate governance models 
There is on-going debate on what drives the existence of modern corporations. On the one 
hand, creating and growing shareholders’ wealth is the key purpose of any company, while 
on the other, the company seeks to satisfy all the stakeholders. There are two distinct 
models of corporate governance models, viz, the stakeholder approach which follows the 
European model, and the shareholder approach which follows the Anglo-American model. 
 
2.3.1.1 Shareholder model 
The Anglo-American approach stresses the superiority of shareholder value and follows the 
single tier board structure. The proponents of this approach believe that the company is 
simply an extension of its owners and consequently, management should be exclusively 
answerable to the owners who are the shareholders (Mthanti & Ojah, 2016). This model 
assumes a widely diffused shareholding where company ownership is separate from control 
(Berle & Means, 1932). The main drawback of companies with low level of concentration in 
ownership is the inability of shareholders to monitor and pay more attention over the 
company affairs. This view creates agency problems, which is the dominant theoretical 
framework for this study. The agency theory will be explored in the next section. 
 
The shareholding model response to the agency problems is as follows: 
▪ The model encourages competition by removing restrictions on factor markets. 
▪ The model encourages voluntary practice of good governance principles. 
▪ To assist in matching the interest of management and shareholders, this model 
recommends performance-based executive compensation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
The shareholder model is criticised for its inability to incorporate outside involvements and 
supplementary duties imposed on companies by government establishments since they are 
presumed to misrepresent unrestricted market operations (Ntim, 2013). In this view, 
companies are financed by equity which is raised from efficient capital markets. Capital 
owners can thus freely move their capital from one company to another through efficient 
capital markets. Similarly, ineffective and unsatisfactory performance from managers cannot 
be tolerated and may result in dismissal and replacement thereby limiting management 
discretion on decision-making (Solomon, 2013). 
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This model is the norm in the USA and Commonwealth countries. Anglo-American model is 
arguably the best suited for the South African corporate governance system because of the 
following reasons (Mthanti & Ojah, 2016): 
▪ South African companies’ board structure is normally single-tiered, without any 
representation of the broader parties, for instance, the community. 
▪ South Africa has highly developed financial markets (e.g. the Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange) with meticulous listing rules and insider trading enforcement.  
▪ The main way of obtaining finance for large corporates in South Africa is through listing 
on the JSE as evidenced by the market capitalisation of the JSE to GDP ratio comparing 
favourably with developed countries.  
▪ South African banks maintain detached relations with their corporate customers by not 
exercising effective control over their undertakings (Rossouw, Van der Watt & Rossouw, 
2002). 
 
However, the Anglo-American model (shareholder approach) may also be ill-suited for South 
Africa and its challenges for the following reason: 
  
▪  It is mainly geared to generating wealth quickly and not necessarily distributing it 
equitably. The Anglo-American approach thus reproduces inequality and may be 
deemed by large segments of society to be unlawful. This is particularly the case in a 
fractured country such as South Africa in order to improve apartheid induced 
exclusion of blacks from the mainstream of the economy. This is currently evidenced 
by high unemployment rates and widespread poverty and disparity (Mthanti & Ojah, 
2016). 
2.3.1.2 Stakeholder model 
Mainly applied in European countries such as Germany, the stakeholder model emphasises 
a wide range of stakeholders. It has a dual board structure that includes all stakeholders and 
contends that companies, as social entities, are accountable to a wide spectrum of 
stakeholders including the workforce and indigenous communities, for example.  
 
While the shareholder model stresses the importance of maximising shareholder value, the 
European stakeholder model may, nonetheless, not be able to prevent boards from pursuing 
narrow self-interests. This is especially so in markets like South Africa where ownership is 
highly concentrated, since controlling and supervisory boards tend to be weak and generally 
submit to management (Solomon, 2013) 
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Like the shareholder model, the stakeholder model subscribes to agency theory which was 
born from the separation of ownership and control. The stakeholder model also concurs with 
the shareholder model in addressing agency problems through the introduction of effective 
contracts between the various stakeholders (Ntim, 2013). Unlike its counterpart, however, 
the stakeholder model allows for occasional outside intervention and regulatory legislation to 
balance creating wealth for a broader set of stakeholders. Moreover, it concurs with the 
shareholding model in the assumption of efficient markets, however the stakeholder model 
assumes a fair share of market inefficiencies. In this regard, the stakeholder model is more 
reliant on debt than equity as a source of finance (Mason & Simmons, 2014). 
 
Below is a depiction of the responsibilities of business under the stakeholder model. 
Figure 1: Stakeholder theory responsibilities of business 
 
Source: Conceptualised from Carroll and Shabana (2010) 
 
The stakeholder model is heavily criticised for its inconsistency with business concepts and 
corporate governance (Solomon, 2013). The key objective of the stakeholder model is 
maximising the interest of all stakeholder by ensuring fairness in distributing the company 
benefits to all stakeholders. As such, the company is prevented from pursuing a single 
objective. This view is not consistent with the business concept which assumes long-term 
value creation and maximising shareholder return on their investments as the main purpose 
of business. However, it is challenging to strike a balance in meeting all stakeholders’ needs 
while creating value for the business and maximising shareholder wealth. Without profit in 
Business
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the long run the company will fail, and this will affect all stakeholders (Ntim, 2013; Solomon, 
2013). 
Accountability is the key principle of corporate governance. The stakeholder model requires 
companies to be accountable to all stakeholders, unlike accountability to shareholders only. 
The third King Report states that a company that is accountable to all stakeholders is 
effectively accountable to no-one (King Report III, 2009). In this regard diffused 
accountability is unrealistic and impracticable in governance terms. 
• However, despite the above arguments, irrespective of whether a country adopts a 
shareholder or stakeholder model, its governance system is used to organise corporate 
power and distribute wealth equally (Mthanti & Ojah, 2016). It is also important to note 
that there is no “one size fits all” in terms of which governance model to adopt. Corporate 
governance practices are increasingly converging due to globalisation, cross-listing 
facilitated by market integration and the proliferation of national (King and Cadbury) and 
transnational (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) codes on 
corporate governance (Ntim, 2013). 
 Corporate Governance theories 
This section is aimed at elucidating the theories that have been advanced to explain the 
board characteristics’ effect on company performance. The complementary nature of each 
theory inspired the use by this research of numerous theoretical viewpoints.  
2.3.2.1 Agency theory  
The continuous diffusion and dilution of equity ownership in companies has led to the 
divergence of ownership and control (Akbar, Poletti-Hughes, El-Faitouri, & Shah, 2016). The 
principals are the owners who assign the agents (as represented by board and executive 
management) to manage the company on their behalf by absorbing some risk (Boshkoska, 
2014). Hence the need by shareholders to continuously monitor and reward managers, 
which then results in agency costs. 
 
 It is the responsibility of managers to run the company in a way which makes the most of 
shareholders capital. Nonetheless, managers’ interests are often perceived as not in tandem 
with the shareholders’ goals (Akeem et al., 2014; Boshkoska, 2014).  Managers have a 
tendency to commit the available funds to realise their own personal goals and reputation 
instead of fostering shareholders’ goals (Alalade et al., 2014). 
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The main challenge encountered by principals is to motivate agents to grant them a return 
on their investments when there is excess cash flow rather than investing in loss-
making ventures (Jensen, 1986).  However, more agent costs will be incurred should 
shareholders commit to controlling management decisions. Accordingly, Smit 
(2015) recommends that managers be the incentivised through the issue of share options to 
match the goals of the agent and those of the principal in order to channel the decision-
making by the agent in the direction of wealth creation. 
 
Agency theory portrays management as self-interested and individualistic (Budiarso et al., 
2018). This focus on individualism overpowers the managers’ own ambitions and goals. 
Hence agency theory can be used to discover the relationship between board characteristics 
of corporate governance and company performance since the practice of good corporate 
governance may be regarded as one of the measures to controlling the agency problems. 
2.3.2.2 Stakeholder theory 
Stakeholder theory stems from the idea that companies serve a bigger purpose besides 
maximising shareholder interest (Freeman, 2010). Unlike agency theory, stakeholder theory 
takes cognisance of both internal and external sociological and organisational aspects that 
are affected by the company’s goals (Friedman & Miles, 2006). This theory follows an 
inclusive approach to decision-making. It stipulates the role of managers not only to 
shareholders but to all stakeholders and to act in favour of all these parties regardless of 
being internal or external to the company (Arsad et al., 2018). Hence the prosperity and 
performance of a company is perhaps assessed based on its ability to satisfy the needs of 
all its stakeholders. 
2.3.2.3 Resource dependency theory 
The resource dependency theory originates from the supposition that external pressures and 
demands are the major constrictions to companies’ survival. According to Nguyen, Locke 
and Reddy (2014), the resource dependence theory is key in explaining the relationship 
between board diversity and enhanced company performance. The theory postulates the 
role played by boards in ensuring that the company has all the necessary resources it needs 
for growth, survival and performance through unlimited access to the external environment 
(Ntim, 2013; Muchemwa et al., 2016). King report III concurs with the resource dependence 
theory by recommending that “the board should comprise the appropriate balance of 
knowledge, skills, experience, diversity and independence for it to discharge its governance 
role and responsibilities objectively and effectively” (King Report III, 2009:32).  
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Resources that are essential to the company are sourced through the appointment of 
directors who have “the appropriate mix of knowledge, skills and experience, including the 
business, commercial and industry experience needed to govern the organisation” (King 
Report III, 2009:32). Ararat et al. (2017) contend that company value could be enhanced if 
the corporate governance of a company included mechanisms that ensured that resources 
available to the company were fully utilised to derive maximum yield. Moreover, the board 
can be useful in providing external resources to the company though ‘director interlocking’. 
Ntim (2013) describes director interlocking as a situation when a member of the board of one 
company is also a director on the boards of other companies. In that way such directors are 
resourceful through their access to a variety of suppliers, social groups, buyers and policy 
makers. Accordingly, the company’s ability to access and source limited resources from its 
external environment influences its financial performance. 
2.3.2.4 Stewardship theory 
This theory recommends giving stewards (as represented by the board) bigger roles to play 
in a company to safeguard stakeholders’ interest. The stewards’ motivation and satisfaction 
are derived from the company’s success. The driver of company success is explained by the 
structures that empower the stewards and give them the freedom to act autonomously. This 
view builds trust hence agency costs of supervising and guiding the stewards’ conduct are 
reduced (Budiarso et al., 2018).  
 
This theory advocates the alignment of management goals with those of the company. 
Proponents of this theory recommend the practice of CEO duality to eliminate individualism 
and agency costs and improve the safeguarding of shareholders’ interest (Van Ness, 
Miesing & Kang, 2010; Nath, Islam & Saha, 2015). 
 
 Corporate governance development in USA and UK 
The corporate failures in the USA and UK were virtually identical, with all emanating from the 
manipulation of accounting records and financial statements following dominant 
management born of ineffective and weak boards, insider trading and failure by both internal 
and external auditors to detect and report irregularities. The USA approach to curb these 
scandals has been centered on passing laws to tighten audit requests, curtail CEO power 
and mandate more on executive remuneration disclosure. This avenue was favored rather 
than improving and empowering board structures, particularly non-executive directors, as 
was done in the UK (Zalewska, 2014).  
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2.3.3.1 Major corporate scandals that shaped corporate governance internationally 
Governance systems were widely criticised after high profile corporate failures (Abid et al., 2018). These scandals were mainly a result of 
greed, corruption, fraud and bribery. The massive losses and reputational damage that follows companies in scandals is an indication of how 
the managers mishandled the company resources to the disadvantage of the stakeholders (Fadun, 2017). Below is an overview of major 
corporate scandals that shaped corporate governance globally. These illustrate the inadequacies of the companies’ corporate governance 
systems. This is a list of some of the major scandals that widely rocked the media; however, it is not exhaustive as not all companies that made 
headlines are in this summary. 
 
Table 2-1: International scandals that influenced corporate governance globally 
Scandal History Flaws in Corporate Governance Lessons learnt 
Polly Peck UK 1990 • British public company in the textile 
industry. 
• Incorporated in UK in 1940  
• Head office in London 
• Employed about 17 000 people 
• By 1990 CEO Asil Nadir had bankrupted 
the company and stolen approximately 
29m pounds and that led to its collapse. 
• Weak board of directors dominated by CEO 
• Nadir, the CEO dominated the decision-
making such that he could make decisions 
without board approval ie acquiring debt 
and transferring of company fund as he 
deemed necessary. 
• Insider trading, theft of money, manipulation 
of share price by executives coupled with 
liquidity problems and high rise in long term 
debts. 
• The need to avoid domination by 
one individual in decision-making. 
Thus, delegation of decision-making 
power to one individual can be 
detriment to the company. 
• The need by the board to observe 
the legal standards of comportment. 
• The risks solely taken by the CEO 
stressed the need for sufficient risk 
management policies and 
procedures. 
Maxwell Communication Group 
UK 1991. 
• Maxwell Communication Corporation 
was a British Media Company. 
• Incorporated in1964 
• It was listed on the London Stock 
Exchange. 
 
• Domineering CEO and Chairman (Maxwell)  
• Maxwell controlled the entire group 
personally and solely made decisions. 
• Maxwell grew the entire group as he 
deemed necessary without regards for 
ethical and professional standards. 
• The board became ineffective. 
• The need for CEO duality to avoid 
domination by CEO. 
• The need to make auditors 
accountable as they failed to detect 
Maxwell’s unscrupulous activities. 
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• Too much debt was obtained using 
company shares as collateral and 
unwarranted transfer of company funds 
 
 
Bank of Credit and Commerce 
International UK 1991. 
 
• Incorporated in 1972 BCCI was an 
international bank with Pakistan origins. 
• The bank was liquidated in 1991 
 
• Incompetence by management and the 
board 
• Improper internal control systems and lack 
of risk assessment procedures in granting of 
loans. 
• This was a case of accounting fraud, 
bribery, bogus transactions and financing 
and laundering money for terrorist- The 
Taliban 
• The bank had a complex structure to hide 
all these irregularities. 
 
• The need for an authentic and 
transparency in banking systems. 
• The need to safeguard stakeholders’ 
interest through independent audits 
and regulations. 
The Asian Crisis 1997 • Started in 1997. • The financial performance of a number of 
East Asian companies’ financial 
performance deteriorated due to failure of 
these companies to govern their activities. 
• Proper development of the 
supervisory and regulatory policies 
and procedures. 
 
Enron USA 2001  • Incorporated in 1985, Enron was a 
supplier of natural gas and electricity 
• Enron went bankrupt in 2001 after SEC 
(Securities and Exchange Commission) 
inquiry and its 5 previous years’ financial 
statements were revised and $586m 
losses were uncovered. 
• CEO duality led to CEO domination. 
• Enron was highly leveraged and 
unprofitable by 2000 and the financial 
statements were manipulated to look 
lucrative 
• Bribed foreign governments to win contracts 
abroad. 
• Failure by the auditors to detect the 
manipulation of financial statements. 
• Auditors should be accountable as 
they should have uncovered 
manipulations of financials and 
reported it in time. 
• Auditing procedures should be 
regulated. 
 
Arthur Andersen USA 2001   • Company lost hundreds of clients and 
collapsed after its involvement in the 
Enron scandal by obstructing the ends 
of justice  
• After the SEC (Securities and Exchange 
Commission) initiated an investigation into 
Enron, the company destroyed audit client’s 
documents that linked them to the scandal. 
• The need to regulate the 
accountably of auditors and their 
audit procedures 
• The need to have efficient and 
effective internal control systems 
that detects fraud. 
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WorldCom USA 2002 • Second largest telecommunication 
supplier in the USA in 1998 and 2002. 
• WorldCom was declared bankruptcy in 
2002 following an investigation that 
related to accounting fraud. 
• The company’s line costs were understated; 
they were treated as capital expenditure 
instead of expenses. 
• The company inflated revenue, net income 
and ABITDA by reducing the reserves and 
increasing the sales revenue by $2.8b 
• The above twisted WorldCom's financials to 
look profitable 
• Undocumented $500 million in computer 
expenses 
• It failed to meet the accounting procedures 
as required by GAAP. 
• Internal communications showed that 
management had knowledge of the 
incorrect accounting procedures since 2000. 
• All these accounting malpractices were not 
discovered by auditors until June 2002. 
  
• Auditors should be held accountable 
and improve their assurance 
function. 
• The rotations of auditors after 5 
years are encouraged to ensure 
independence by auditors prevail. 
• Systems of external and internal 
controls should be monitored 
ImClone Systems Incorporated 
USA 2002 
• ImClone Systems established in 1984 
as a biopharmaceutical company. 
• The company collapsed due to insider 
trading affair in 2002. 
• Breach of fiduciary duty by CEO 
• The CEO had inside information on the 
rejection new major venture of the company 
such that Waksal's family and close friends 
benefited from the sale of their stock just 
before the announcement of the rejected 
deal. 
• CEO was found guilty of insider trading 
charges  
  
• The need for stronger and tighter 
controls that prevent and detect 
insider trading. 
Tyco International USA 2002 • Tyco International operated in over 100 
countries specialising in high tech 
research and development 
• CEO Dennis Koslowski was also the 
chairman of the board. 
• The Tyco scandal was a case of 
greediness by the CEO and CFO (Mark 
Stewart). 
• The USA SEC (Securities and 
• The company was defrauded of $600 million 
through a racketeering scheme comprising 
stock fraud, unapproved bonuses, 
unauthorised interest free loans and 
fabricated expense accounts. 
• Improper and or lack of controls to detect 
fraud 
• Lack of supervision and control by senior 
management 
• The need to avoid CEO-chairman 
duality as it weakens the board. 
• The remuneration of executives 
should be monitored  
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Exchange Commission) investigation 
revealed that Tyco manipulated their 
financials.  
• Improper auditing procedures by the 
auditors to detect fraud 
• CEO duality led to the domination of the 
board by the CEO 
 
Parmalat Italy 2002   • Parmalat was the supplier of dairy 
products.  
• It is an international business, which is 
what makes the scandal a huge affair. 
• Calisto Tanzi (the founder) held both 
CEO and the board chairman positions. 
He was accused of manipulating 
accounting records in 2003 to the value 
of14 billion pounds. 
• Parmalat lacked board independence as the 
Tanzi family dominated the board which led 
to the pursuit of non-core business activities 
that left the company in huge debt 
• The composition of Parmalat’s key board 
committees was weak 
• Lorenzo Penca of Grant Thornton auditing 
company Parmalat (external auditor) were 
not rotated every 3 years as per Italian 
corporate governance 
• Calisto Tanzi was both CEO and the board 
chairman. 
• The involvement of auditors, executive 
directors, senior management and bankers 
weakened the internal control 
• The company's finance directors concealed 
large debts.  
• The need for internal control and risk 
management functions to enhance 
the excellence in reporting. 
• The need to define procedures for 
the internal control system. 
• The need to verify the systems of 
internal control system is working 
effectively as required. 
• The need to impose strict regulation 
on independent directors, executive 
director and auditors. 
Adelphia USA 2002 • Aldelphia was a cable franchise formed 
in 1952 that was turned into a 
communications empire by John Rigas 
and his brother in 1972, its founder. 
• It was a family business. 
• The Rigas family treated Adelphia as 
their personal piggy bank by taking out 
money for personal expenses and 
personal investments. 
• The company went bankrupt in 2002 
due to internal corruption. 
• Fraud charges were laid against CEO 
John Rigas. 
 
• The Rigas family dominated management 
and the board such that they became 
ineffective. 
• The Rigas family was involved in accounting 
fraud to cover high debts and sham 
transactions. This abuse of power resulted 
in self-enrichment for the family 
• The need for ethical leadership and 
financial control procedures to detect 
such acts of corruption and fraud 
• Board independence should be 
enforced in family-controlled 
businesses to ensure effective 
monitoring and control of the 
business. 
• The need to avoid CEO-chairman 
duality as it weakens the board. 
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Mutual Funds USA 2003 • The Mutual Funds were investigated 
significantly ethical until the Attorney 
General of New York, Eliot Spitzer 
charged them of insider trading and 
elicitation of illegal gains. 
 
• Detection of illegal market timing and late 
trading practices which may constitute 
insider trading on the part of certain hedge 
fund and mutual fund companies. 
 
• The need for stronger and tighter 
controls that prevent insider trading. 
Royal Dutch Shell UK  2004 • An international British gas and oil 
company incorporated in the UK. 
• In 2002 Shell had not sufficiently funded 
the oil to enhance production. 
• The small fields of oil were not sufficient 
to meet the production supplies. 
 
• Shell was found guilty in 2004 January of 
not funding sufficient its oil to cover the 
anticipated production 
• Huge losses were incurred as a result of 
fines from the Financial Services Authority 
and subsequently stakeholders lost faith in 
the group when the chairman of the board 
departed. 
• The need for regular independent 
audits to ensure internal controls are 
functioning as required ensuring 
quality accounting records  
• High targets should be set to 
incentivise the executive bonuses. 
• The need for independent auditors to 
identify any forms of financial 
statements manipulation.  
Siemens Germany 2006 • Founded in1893, with international 
footprint in about 190 countries 
consisting approximately 400 000 
employees. 
• Siemens was accused of corruption and 
bribery. 
• About 300 employees were implicated in the 
se bribery cases. 
• To maintain the secrecy, generous bonuses 
were awarded to employees leaving the 
company. 
• As revealed by the German authorities, 
Siemens had paid about 1.3 billion Euros in 
bribes for the past 7 years using illegal 
funds. 
• These payments were to facilitate the 
winning of contracts worldwide including the 
tender for 2004 Olympics in Athens. 
• The board was negligent in failing to provide 
sufficient oversight, control and direction to 
the company, thus impairing the investors’ 
confidence, company integrity and 
professional credibility in general.  
• The need for ethical leadership and 
financial control procedures to detect 
such acts of corruption and fraud. 
• The need for confidential platforms 
for employees to air their grievances 
confidentially. 
• The need for regular independent 
audits to ensure internal controls are 
functioning as required ensuring 
quality accounting records. 
Subprime Loans USA 2007 • The scandal relates to the 2007 housing 
crisis. 
• The drop in demand for mortgage loans 
and price in key housing markets 
• Offering loans without security 
• Huge losses were incurred due to increased 
defaults in payments by borrowers. 
• Special Purpose Entities were set up to hide 
• The need by the senior executives to 
have the necessary expertise and 
experience to effectively control and 
monitor credit and market risks 
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caused the mortgagees to forfeit 
payments and abandon houses, 
resulting in the bank having been left 
with both the property and the unpaid 
loan  
• The losses from mortgage-backed 
securities totaled $200 billion. 
• Senior executives were arrested. 
  
and repackage the mortgages. 
• The company incurred huge losses. 
• The management and the board indicated 
incompetence by taking in more risks for the 
company and intensified risk behaviour but 
issued new structured financing instruments 
 
tolerated by the company.  
Lehman Brothers USA 2008  • Founded in 1850 by Lehman Brothers. 
• It was a financial services 
company involved in mortgage 
origination. 
• However, the company was a real 
estate hedge fund that was camouflaged 
as an investment bank. Hence its 
vulnerability to downturns in real estate 
values. 
• Poor market conditions in the mortgage 
space resulted in huge losses as the 
conditions demanded a significant 
decrease in its dealings in the subprime 
space. 
• The Lehman Brothers was declared 
bankrupt and collapsed in 2008 
 
• Lehman Brothers was highly leveraged by 
end of 2007. 
• It had borrowed significant amounts to fund 
its investments. 
• It had significant business undertakings 
worldwide 
 
 
• The need by the senior executives to 
have the necessary expertise and 
experience to effectively control and 
monitor credit and market risks 
tolerated by the company. 
• The need for sufficient safeguarding 
measures for inters’ assets. 
• The need for proper policies and 
procedures to quantify all risks in the 
financial markets. 
 
Source: Researcher’s own construct 
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2.3.3.2 United Kingdom corporate governance 
According to Tshipa et al. (2018c), the corporate governance structures of the South African 
corporate environment is similar to that of UK, therefore the analysis below wishes to 
examine the characteristics of the UK corporate governance mechanisms. The UK corporate 
governance structures follow a stakeholder-centred approach to business principles. 
Muravyev, Talavera and Weir (2016) reiterate that the UK presents some of the best 
governance standards globally, ranking as the fifth most important economy.  
 
The Cadbury Report 1992 
The report was instigated by the British government. In December 1992, the Cadbury 
Committee released the Cadbury Report which was a collection of identical ideals organised 
as standards of corporate governance.  The report stressed the principles of integrity, 
openness and accountability to enhance the integrity of auditing and financial reporting. The 
Cadbury Report recommended the following key principles from its code of best practices: 
▪ Discouragement of CEO duality.  
▪ The board should comprise at the minimum three non-salaried directors, with at least 
two of which not having any direct or indirect connections to the company. 
▪ The board of every business should have an independent audit committee 
comprising at the minimum three non-salaried directors with no connection to the 
company. 
▪  The remuneration of executives should be fully disclosed and be objectively set by a 
remuneration committee. 
▪ The selection and engagement of board members need to be delegated to the 
nomination committee consisting at the minimum one non-salaried director with no 
connection to the company. 
 
These principles became a listing requisite for the London Stock Exchange on a ‘comply or 
explain’ basis (Cadbury, 1992). 
 
Greenbury Report 1995 
Published in 1998 in the UK, the Greenbury Report concentrated on directors’ remuneration 
standards, recommending the following: 
▪ The remuneration committees should be made up only of non-salaried directors with 
no connection to the company. 
▪ The AGM should be attended by the chairman of the remuneration committee to 
answer shareholders’ questions on remuneration of executives’ matters. 
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▪ Directors’ remuneration including the name of directors should be released in the 
annual reports 
▪ Excessive ‘golden handshakes’ should be eliminated by implementing fixed-term 
contracts of one year for directors. 
▪ Performance-based compensation structures for directors should be introduced to 
enhance lasting company performance. 
 
The Hampel Report 1998 
Published in 1998 in the UK, the report contended that:  
▪ Prescriptive rules were outdated as broad principles were necessary to ensure good 
governance  
▪ Flexibly in the application of sound governance practices that meet each company’s 
individual circumstances enhance good governance. 
▪ The board’s key responsibility is to the company shareholders.  
▪ Recommended self-regulation method of governance as such there was no need for 
more company legislation. 
 
The UK Combined Code 1998 
Released in 1998, the UK Combined Code consolidated previous codes which were 
incorporated into the London Stock Exchange’s listing requirements. The new code set out 
standards of best practice for board composition, director remuneration, accountability and 
audit in relation to shareholders. The code was accepted on the ‘comply or explain’ basis for 
all companies incorporated in the UK. This report was revised in 2006, 2008 and 2009. 
 
The Turnbull Report 1999 
Published in 1999, the Turnbull Report identified risk assessment through internal control 
analysis as a vital part of corporate governance processes. This report shed light on the 
internal controls of companies including financial, operational, compliance and risk 
management.  
 
The Myners Report 2001 
The report considered the functions of institutional investors. It explained the significance of 
good governance for diverse companies by proposing principles that facilitated the 
controlling and directing of companies in a manner which fulfils the goals of the 
shareholders. These proposals were designed to accomplish greater responsibility by life 
mutual funds to their members through procedures that encourage improved internal 
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analysis of management by the boards as well as the functions of the UK’s financial 
regulatory body. 
 
The Higgs Report 2003 
The UK government assigned Derek Higgs to conduct an independent appraisal concerning 
functions and efficacy of non-salaried directors. The report recommended more 
empowerment of non-salaried directors and limiting the influence of the CEO (Zalewska, 
2014). 
  
The Tyson Report 2003 
The key emphasis of the Tyson Report was on board diversity and independence (Zalewska, 
2014). 
 
The UK Stewardship Code 2010 
First issued in 2010, the UK Stewardship Code was revised in 2012 to replace the UK 
Combined Code. The Stewardship Code centered on governance principles relating to 
efficient monitoring of a company’s performance and communication required between the 
company and the institutional investors (Financial Reporting Council, 2012a). 
 
The UK Corporate Governance Code 2010  
The first code on corporate governance was promulgated in 2010 for the first time and then 
reviewed in 2012, 2014 and 2016. Following the global financial crisis, the FRC revised the 
governance code.  This code was initially focused on improving interaction between the 
board and shareholders (Financial Reporting Council, 2012b). The 2012 code focused on 
the accountability of the board (Financial Reporting Council, 2012a). In 2014, the revised 
code concentrated on the enhanced availability of details about the risks that affect the 
continued sustainability of companies. The 2016 revised version incorporated the European 
Union regulation on issues of audit committees (Financial Reporting Council, 2016). 
 
Conclusion 
Numerous reports were commissioned in the UK following a series of corporate scandals. 
These reports were regularly reviewed and included principles on board structure, 
remuneration, committees, roles and standards of external auditors and internal controls. 
However, none of the recommendations were enforced by law thus no penalties for non-
compliance were sustained. 
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2.3.3.3 USA corporate governance 
The USA follows a shareholder approach to corporate governance where companies are 
primarily perceived to be pursuing the financial interests of shareholders (Ntim, 2013). The 
series of high-profile corporate governance failures in the United States such as Enron, 
Tyco, Adelphi and others led to the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002 and the 
Dodd-Frank Act in 2010 (Tshipa & Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, 2015). 
 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 
Following the commissioning of the law in 2002 by US congress in response to corporate 
failures, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was mandated to administer the 
law and the application of corporate governance principles became mandatory (Van Ness et 
al., 2010; Tshipa et al., 2018a). 
 
The Nasdaq Stock Exchange as well as New York Stock Exchange adopted the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act which advocated for stringent auditing standards and procedures for listed 
companies (Sarbanes, 2002; Van Ness et al., 2010). According to Sarbanes (2002), the 
following are the main provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act:  
▪ The larger number of board members must not have any relations with the company. 
▪ The memberships of audit, remuneration and nomination committees must be 
independent. 
▪ Performance-related remuneration must be enforced. 
▪ Meetings of directors who are not employed by the company on a full-time basis to 
be held separately. 
▪ Corporate chapters written to evaluate CEOs and select new board members. 
▪ Stringent procedures for granting of personal loans to directors and management 
executives. 
▪ Compulsory for listed companies on New York Stock Exchange to implement those 
provisions between 15 January 2004 and 31 October 2004.  
▪ Criminal penalties for non-compliance with the Act and violation of accounting 
practices defined. 
 
Dodd-Frank Act 2010 
In addition to the SOX requirements on remuneration disclosure, the Dodd-Frank Act 
focused on the following according to Zalewska (2014): 
▪ Disclosure of the average annual overall remuneration of all workers and the 
proportion of this average to the CEO total remuneration. 
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▪ Shareholders were sanctioned to have power to influence executive directors’ 
remuneration in annual statements. 
▪ Disclosure for reason of CEO duality by the company. 
 
Council of Institutional Investors  
It was set up in 1985 to provide more information on public pension funds about 
investing their members’ retirement resources. 
 
Conclusion 
Different bodies in the USA addressed corporate governance standards. However, there is 
no document on corporate governance that is applied solely. The principles contained in all 
the reports are similar to worldwide corporate governance principles. 
  
2.4 SOUTH AFRICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE  
 Origins of corporate governance practise in South Africa 
According to Waweru (2014), corporate governance was first practiced in developed 
countries; however, South Africa as a developing country has been phenomenal in keeping 
pace with developed nations in terms of corporate governance practices. As an emerging 
economy, South Africa requires well-run companies in order to attract investment, facilitate 
job creation for the young generation and compete in the global market (Ntim, 2013). 
 
South Africa is a member of the BRICS nations, which is the mainstay of stability in the world 
economies (Tshipa & Mokoaleli-Mokoteli, 2015). According to Muniandy and Hillier (2015), 
South Africa is undoubtedly the largest and leader in economic development in the sub-
Saharan Africa. However, it is still an emerging market characterised by high unemployment, 
socio-economic disparities and poverty. 
 
According to the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Global Competitiveness Index (2017), the 
JSE is regarded as one of the most highly regulated stock exchanges in the world. Good 
leadership in corporate governance is a key factor in South Africa’s continued economic 
dominance in the region (Muniandy & Hillier, 2015). However, these cutting-edge corporate 
governance practices at international standards are a recent development. 
 
According to Armstrong, Segal and Davis (2006), the South African economy followed a 
shareholder-centric, Anglo-American model in which companies were led by entrenched and 
34 
 
complacent managers who were disorientated and gave rise to agency costs. This was, 
however, before the introduction of King I in 1992 by the Institute of Directors in Southern 
Africa. Nonetheless, these companies have survived due to a different economic climate 
from the third world economies. Mthanti and Ojah (2016) identified these companies’ main 
shield from foreign competition as economic and political quarantine by means of sanctions 
during apartheid which kept foreign companies out of the local market. During that time 
South African corporate policies, practices, procedures, laws and regulations lagged far 
behind international standards. 
 
According to Nag (2016), the end of apartheid and the release of Nelson Mandela from 
prison paved the way for the South African economic climate, corporate landscape and 
markets to embrace change. This was aided by a new in political climate with the rise to 
power of the black-dominated African National Congress (ANC). This rapidly led to trade 
liberalisation, demand of transnational financiers, evolving markets and prompt regulatory 
reform (Mthanti & Ojah, 2016). Since 1994, irrevocable change has occurred in corporate 
structures with the dismantling of conglomerates and corporate restructuring. This transition 
in South Africa took place at the same time as interest in corporate governance was rising 
globally as a tool to protect shareholders’ interests. Moreover, international standards in 
listing procedures, the adoption of accounting standards, laws and regulations have slowly 
become the order of the day. 
 
The path to democracy taken by South African government after 1994 explains these rapid 
changes. The government made a choice to shy away from property seizure and pursued 
growth, which in turn funded community services and job creation. However, to achieve 
greater development, South Africa needed both local and foreign finance as well as efficient 
use of that finance (Muniandy & Hillier, 2015). High standards of corporate governance were 
induced by the need for finance which was essential for corporate growth. In this light, 
corporate governance by means of effective decision-making and efficient monitoring 
impacts enhanced stability and growth prospects of companies. 
 
The market has been a major player in corporate governance transformation in South Africa; 
the South African corporate sector became very competitive following the attainment of 
independence in 1994 and the advent of democracy (Waweru, 2014). Upon the return of 
international investors in 1994, the South African markets were heavily criticised in terms of 
performance, corporate structure and governance. Hence the desire to apply and meet 
international standards has been the driving force for change in the accounting profession, 
government, the stock exchange and regulatory bodies. 
35 
 
   
Despite having developed solid corporate governance principles through the issuance of 
King Reports, South Africa has experienced a number of corporate scandals. Names such 
as Telkom, PPC, Regal Treasury African Bank, Fidentia, JCI-Randgold and Macmed are 
amongst the corporate disgraces of South Africa (Nag, 2016). However, South Africa is 
considered to be a noticeable power in corporate governance practices in Africa and the 
world at large. This is explained by the compulsory application of the King Reports as a 
listing requirement for JSE. Therefore, South African companies are recommended to 
implement effective governance procedures and practices that are consistent and 
sustainable to effect and complement objectives of improving company performance (Tshipa 
et al., 2018c) 
2.4.2 Acts influencing corporate governance in South Africa  
Despite the political transition of 1994 that marked the end of apartheid era, South Africa is 
still suffering from high levels of poverty, racism and inequality. Moreover, South African 
society is fragmented along ethnic and financial lines and the country’s economy is split 
(Mthanti & Ojah, 2016). In a bid to curb the above effects of decades of white colonialism 
and apartheid, the South African administration introduced acts that have profound influence 
on the application of corporate governance principles. The following is a summary of the key 
local acts that haves influenced governance in South Africa. 
 
Table 2-2: Major Acts that shaped corporate governance in South African context 
Act Provisions 
Labour Relations Act of 1995 It is aimed at inspiring voluntary collective bargaining and 
settlement of disputes relating to dismissals. 
Basic Conditions of Employment 
Act 1997 
Enacted to set the minimum requirements of employment for 
employers to adhere to thereby giving effect to fair labour 
practices. 
Employment Equity Amendment 
Act, No 47 of 2013 
This act promotes equality in the working environment through 
eradication of discrimination by upholding equal prospects for 
all races and genders ensuring the workplace are 
demographically representative of the SA population, thereby 
enhancing financial growth and productivity in the working 
environment.  
Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment Act of 2003 
 
Promotion of Equality and 
Prevention of Unfair Discrimination 
Act of 2000 
To increase the control and ownership of South African 
companies by South African blacks to influence racial 
transformation and economic growth. 
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Preferential Procurement 
Framework Act 2000 
 
 
 
 
Insider Trading Act 1998 
 
  
Enacted to prohibit individuals with access to inside information 
on the performance of securities or financial instruments from 
engaging in dealings relating to those instruments, thereby 
providing guidelines and empowering the Financial Services 
Board to deal with such matters by providing civil and criminal 
law penalties. 
Public Finance Management Act of 
1999 
An act aimed to ensure sound financial management practises 
are adhered to both in government and public institutions to 
facilitate transparency and accountability in the management of 
finances by providing a guideline for efficient and effective 
management of assets, liabilities, expenses and income. 
Company’s Act Amendments of 
1999 
It sets out the liabilities of directors in their dealings on behalf of 
the company, compels the appointment of the company 
secretary for public companies and disclosure of share owners. 
 
Bank’s Act Amendments of 1999 This act imposes higher levels of corporate governance in local 
banks. 
JSE Listings Requirements 
revisions of 1995 and 2000 
JSE’s listing requirements have been revised to ensure 
companies are adhering to certain principles of corporate 
governance. 
Source: Conceptualised from African Corporate Governance Network (2016) 
 
2.4.3 King Reports 
According to Muniandy and Hillier (2015), the King Reports set the tone for South African 
business behaviour by providing management with well-defined principles of corporate 
governance. Waweru (2014) and Smit (2015) claim the King Reports to be the world’s 
leading corporate governance standards. The King Committee was set up in 1992 by the 
Institute of Directors in Southern Africa (IoDSA). The major provisions of the report are 
sustainability, leadership and corporate citizenship (King Report III, 2009). The recurring 
iterations of the King Reports have placed South Africa on the global map. The status of 
South African corporate governance as a result of these reports is held in high esteem 
because of their implications for shareholder protection.  
 
2.4.3.1 King I Report 
This was the first report by the King Committee commissioned in November 1994 and which 
was born around the same time South Africa was being integrated into the international 
economy at the end of apartheid (Pamburai et al., 2015). King I ranked sixth set of codes of 
corporate governance issued globally after the US, Hong Kong, Ireland, UK and Canada in 
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1978, 1989, 1991, 1992 and 1993 respectively. This marked South Africa as the first country 
in sub-Sahara to be the forerunner of a set of corporate governance principles (African 
Corporate Governance Network, 2016). Compliance with the codes of King I was not 
mandatory, based on approach of ‘comply or explain’. King I identified the effective board of 
directors as significant component of good corporate governance (Muniandy & Hillier, 2015).  
 
Although, the King I report adopted numerous standards and principles from the international 
corporate governance codes, particularly those supported by Cadbury Report of 1992 in the 
United Kingdom (Pamburai et al., 2015). The King Report diverted from the shareholder 
primacy approach to an inclusive approach and prescribed an ‘integrated’ methodology to 
corporate governance taking into account the needs of all stakeholders by incorporating the 
social, financial, ethical and environmental aspects (Andreasson, 2011). It was during the 
same time; corporate governance became a widespread issue of concern following the fall of 
major international corporate collapses that were well publicised for instance Bank of Credit 
and commerce International (BCCI) and Maxwell Communications Corporations.  
 
2.4.3.2 King II Report 
The changing worldwide economic environment, accompanied by regulatory and legislative 
advances, led to the updating of King I. Locally, this amendment was driven by post-
apartheid changes such as the promulgation of the Employment Equity Act, 55 of 1998 
whilst internationally it was the introduction of the Combined Code of 1998 in the UK 
(Pamburai et al., 2015). The King II report was published in 2002 and targeted companies 
that were listed on JSE. It was based on the principles of listed companies complying with 
King II or explaining why they were not doing so. King II advocated the triple bottom line 
which embraces not only the company’s economic value but its social responsibility and 
environmental activities as well (Ntim, 2013). 
 
According to Andreasson (2011), the King II Report originated from stakeholder theory and 
known for taking on an “inclusive stakeholder-centred approach to corporate governance 
including employment equity (EE), affirmative action, Broad-Based Black Economic 
Empowerment (B-BBEE) and environment”. These statutory changes resulted in the need to 
ensure equitable demographic representative of the South African population in the 
workplace and improve the control and ownership of South African companies by black 
South African shareholders. This was important to address the lingering effects of apartheid.  
The influence of the King II Report on legislative transformations and regulatory measures 
was remarkable in creating corporate integrity in South Africa. Notably the Companies Act of 
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2008 was modified in 2011 and this strengthened the application of corporate governance 
codes for corporate sector entities. 
 
2.4.3.3 King III Report 
The Companies Act, 71 of 2008 and the rapid changes in international governance trends 
necessitated the compilation of the third report by the King Committee which was published 
in 2010 (Pamburai et al., 2015). This report adopted the voluntary stakeholder approach. 
Moreover, its approach tried to preserve the Anglo-American model. 
 
 The distinguishing feature of King III is its focus on integrated reporting. It became 
compulsory of companies listed on the JSE to produce an “integrated report” effective 1 
March 2010 or to explain any non-compliance. According to Muniandy and Hillier (2015), 
South Africa is the first nation to give an injunction on the integrated report while providing 
guidelines and standards for the notion. In this regard South Africa had set the tone for other 
nations. 
 
This study considered the period 2011-2016 affording precise attention to the King III 
principles. Chapter 3 provide a detailed dialogue on corporate governance research 
instrument applied according to the King III Report recommendations. 
 
The King III philosophy was centred on the notions of leadership, sustainability and 
corporate citizenship. It consisted of a set of principles, guidance and practises that could be 
adopted willingly by all corporations irrespective of their form or way of incorporation. 
 
2.4.3.4 King IV Report 
Published in 2016, King IV application since 1 April 2017 established the central role of the 
governing body of corporate governance, as represented by board of directors. King IV 
described the governing body as the provider of a well-organised and ethical management 
system within the company, achieved through the principles of competence, responsibility, 
integrity, fairness and transparency. King IV 2016 maintains that good governance assists 
the company in achieving the following: 
▪ Good performance 
▪ Ethical culture 
▪ Effective control  
▪ Legitimacy. 
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Although it is not mandatory in terms of South African law, adherence to the King reports has 
been welcomed by numerous companies because of its ability to provide managers with 
well-defined standards and principles of corporate governance. 
 
2.4.3.5 Internal governance comparison of Cadbury Report and South African King 
Reports 
According to Waweru (2014), South Africa’s colonial connection to Britain has influenced its 
adoption of corporate laws and corporate practices from the UK. The King Committee 
adopted some of the principles included in the King reports from the UK Cadbury report of 
1992.  
 
The King reports held a similar view to the Cadbury report by advocating for a unitary board 
of directors headed by a chairman who has been nominated by shareholders. This was 
aimed at resolving the principal-agent problem by holding management accountable. The 
emphasis was made on the chairperson’s position to be held by a separate individual from 
CEO. 
 
In addition, the King reports adopted an internal audit control and risk management from the 
Cadbury report and recommended that every South African company must have internal 
audit headed by the Chief Audit Executive to continuously monitor controls and procedures. 
  
The King Reports held a similar view to the Cadbury Report by recommending that the 
directors of South African companies prepare annual reports in conformance with GAAP as 
required by the South African Accounting Standards Board and the listings regulations of the 
JSE. 
 
Like the Cadbury report, the King reports recommended that South African companies adopt 
the principle of self-regulation by observing applicable laws, standards, rules and 
regulations. 
 
However, unlike the Cadbury report, the King reports recommended that South African 
companies improve their disclosure practices and recognise and preserve the significance of 
the relationship between a company and the social and environmental aspects it exists in. 
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Table 2-3: Internal governance comparison of Cadbury Report and South African King Reports 
Below is an overview of each report in comparison to the Cadbury Report of 1992 from which the King Committee adopted some of the 
principles. 
 
Internal Governance 
Recommendation 
Cadbury Report  First King Report Second King Report Third King Report Fourth King Report 
Board Structure Single board system Single board system Single board system Single board system Single board system 
Salaried Director Undefined Undefined Undefined minimum CEO and 
additional finance 
director for listed 
companies 
minimum CEO and 
additional finance 
director for listed 
companies 
Non-Salaried Director Minimum three Minimum two Most of the board 
members ought to be 
non-salaried directors 
Most of the board 
members ought to be 
non-salaried directors 
Most of the board 
members ought to be 
non-salaried directors 
Independent Non-Executive 
Director 
Minimum two Undefined The greater of non-
employee board 
members should not 
hold any interest in the 
company directly or 
indirectly. 
The greater of non-
employee board 
members should not 
hold any interest in the 
company directly or 
indirectly. 
Most of non-employee 
board members should 
not hold any interest in 
the company directly or 
indirectly. 
Non-Employee Director 
Tenure 
Undefined Undefined At most 3 years At most 3 years Not specified, 
recommend staggered 
replacement 
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CEO Duality Discouraged Discouraged Discouraged Discouraged Discouraged 
Directors’ Remuneration Undefined Undefined Recommend disclosure 
of individual director’s 
remuneration  
Recommend disclosure 
of individual director’s 
remuneration  
Recommend disclosure 
of individual director’s 
remuneration  
Board Size, Diversity and 
Demographics 
Not specified, however 
recommended the 
board to consider the 
environment and 
circumstances to 
determine proper mix  
Not specified, however 
recommended the 
board to consider the 
environment and 
circumstances to 
determine proper mix  
Not specified, however 
recommended the board 
to consider the 
environment and 
circumstances to 
determine proper mix  
Not specified, however 
recommended the board 
to consider the 
environment and 
circumstances to 
determine proper mix  
Not specified, however 
recommended the board 
to consider the 
environment and 
circumstances to 
determine proper mix  
Board Meetings on a regular basis at least quarterly at least quarterly at least quarterly at least quarterly 
Staggered Boards Not more than 3 years 
on board 
none Not more than 3 years 
on board 
Not more than 3 years 
on board 
Not more than 3 years 
on board 
Insider Trading Undefined undefined Insider trading prohibited Insider trading prohibited Insider trading prohibited 
Risk Management 
 
None 
 
none Recommended through 
risk committee 
Recommended through 
risk committee 
Recommended through 
risk committee 
Accounting and Financial 
Reporting Standards  
According to GAAP 
standards 
According to GAAP 
standards 
According to IFRS 
standards 
According to IFRS 
standards 
According to IFRS 
standards 
Internal Audit Function Applicable Applicable Applicable Applicable Applicable 
Internal Control Function Applicable Applicable Applicable Applicable Applicable 
Regulation Approach Voluntary and self-
policed approach 
Voluntary and self-
policed approach 
Voluntary and self-
policed approach 
Voluntary and self-
policed approach 
Voluntary and self-
policed approach 
CG Type Financial Integrated Inclusive Inclusive Inclusive 
Governance Model European approach Anglo-American model Hybrid approach, 
broader stakeholder 
European approach European approach 
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interest yet largely 
preserving the Anglo-
American model 
Source: Researcher’s own construct  
2.4.4 Corporate scandals in South Africa 
The deterioration of ethical values and lack of accountability of those charged with governance was evidenced by continuous corporate failure 
in South Africa. This resulted in many people questioning the recommended corporate governance principles contained in the King Reports 
(Smit, 2015).  
 
Table 2-4: Corporate scandals in South Africa 
Below is an outline of selected South African corporate failures that made headlines in the media. 
 
Scandal History Flaws in Corporate Governance Lessons learnt 
Beige Holdings Limited 1999 • Leading contract manufacturer and 
distributor in South Africa of: 
➢ Cosmetics; soaps; homecare 
products; toiletries; 
➢ Laundry soaps; bath products; 
a 
➢ Personal care products. 
• With about 750 employees. 
• Listed in 2003 on JSE’s AltX 
• Rapid growth drive in 1998 
exhausted the company’s 
resources as it was funded by 
company’s shares and cash. 
• Tax fee payments made to 
directors 
• Restatement of 1997 financial 
results prior listing 
• Abuse of company credit cards 
• Overstatement of revenue and 
profits to increase share prices 
• 3 executives fired for financial 
fraud in accounting 
irregularities. 
• Failure by the auditors to 
uncover fraudulent activities 
• The need for improved 
oversight role by the auditors 
and enforce accountability of 
auditors 
• The need by the board to 
introduce and implement the 
applicable checks and 
procedures, mostly where 
finances are concerned. 
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Johannesburg Consolidated 
Investments. (JCI) 
• Accounting irregularities were 
traced back from April 2002 
• Accounting irregularities 
stemming from: 
➢ Asset overstatement 
➢ Internal control 
systems manipulation 
• The need for appropriate use of 
high driven performance 
incentives to executives. 
Macmed 1999 • A healthcare company. 
• The fraud occurred between 1998 
and 1999 
• Lost R982million to fraud 
• Collapsed in 1999 
 
• The financial statements were 
manipulated to look better by: 
➢ Falsifying invoices to 
overstate profits 
• Need to implement personal 
liability for executives who 
either knowingly participates in 
misconduct, or who fail to make 
sure the implementation of 
adequate risk management. 
Such liability will provide 
rational chance of enticing ex 
post judicial inspection of 
managerial oversight. 
Saambou Holdings Limited • The irregularities in accounting 
occurred in 2000 and 2001 
• Financial statements were 
manipulated to look favourable 
• The need for co-ordinated 
approach by management to 
measure and evaluate 
companywide risk exposures to 
fraud. 
Tigon Limited • Manipulations of financial 
statements from 1997 to 1999 
• Investors were defrauded R160m. 
• Non-compliance with GAAP 
➢ Line expenses were 
capitalised 
➢ Manipulation of 
financial statements 
using fabricated journal 
entries 
 
 
• The need for competent board 
oversight and vigorous risk 
management with reference to 
accepted standards and 
governance codes like King 
Report. 
• The need for tighter controls on 
the classification of costs. 
LeisureNet 2002 • Lifestyle and health fitness 
company 
• The Executives treated 
company finance as their 
• The need to enforce tighter 
penalties for financial fraud 
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• About R1.2 billion was lost to fraud 
by senior executives. 
• Went into liquidation and collapsed 
in 2000 
 
personal [piggy banks. 
• Manipulation of financial 
statements to look favourable. 
• The need for auditors to be held 
accountable for their inability to 
detect such manipulation of 
financials. 
Steinhoff 2017 • Steinhoff International was the 
second biggest furniture and 
homeware retailer in the world. 
 
• Corruption and fraud stemming 
from manipulation of financial 
figures, unethical conduct 
stemming from greed and 
relentless quest of financial 
profits by not disclosing its 
acquisition of a 45% interest in 
Swiss company (GT Branding 
Holding) in 2015. 
• The need to instil a mind-set 
that strong governance is not 
just about financial and 
regulatory compliance but 
creation of an ethical culture 
that promotes prudent financial 
management and transparent 
reporting. 
• State capture 2017 
➢ KPMG 2017 
➢ McKinsey 
➢ Naspers 
➢ SAP 
➢ Transnet 
➢ Eskom 
• In her report published November 
2016, the former Public Protector 
Thuli Madonsela outlined the way 
in which the former President of 
the RSA Jacob Zuma and senior 
officials in government have 
conspired with a shadow network 
of corrupt brokers. 
• The report outlined allegations of 
corruption, irregularity and 
personal enrichment of President 
Jacob Zuma and his government 
officials through the Gupta linked 
companies. 
• Through their ties to Jacob Zuma, 
the Gupta family had placed 
themselves into a position where 
they could influence the 
nomination of Cabinet positions 
• Money-laundering 
• Sham transactions by 
government entities and Gupta 
family members and Gupta 
linked entities 
• Pravin Gordhan, the former 
Minister of Finance estimated 
the total costs of state capture 
R250 billion. 
• Auditors’ failure to uncover and 
report the fraudulent activities. 
• McKinsey& company was 
charged of fraud, racketeering 
and collusion for ignoring 
warnings of possible dubious 
deals with Trillian, Eskom and 
other Gupta-linked companies 
• KPMG facilitated the draining 
of state resources and 
• The need to inspire a culture of 
transparency and accountability 
that those in power establish 
around the laws  
• The need to create an 
environment that put emphasis 
on creating an ethical culture 
and mind-set as recommended 
by King IV 
• The need to regulate the 
accounting profession and 
auditors. 
• The needs to be reinforce the 
oversight capacities of IRBA 
and the GAAP monitoring panel 
of the JSE. 
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and influence the running of 
government activities in order to 
fraudulently award government 
contracts and benefits to enrich 
themselves at the expense of the 
citizens. 
• The rand value deteriorated, and 
South Africa experienced a 
recession and was rated to junk 
status by global credit ratings 
agency. 
 
escaping tax by the Guptas. 
•  KPMG abetted the 
manufacture a document at the 
South African Revenue Service 
that was prominent in get rid of 
anti-corruption executives. 
• Naspers’s TV unit MultiChoice 
had a corrupt relationship with 
ANN7, a 24-hour news channel 
formerly owned by the Gupta 
family. 
• To secure contracts from 
Transnet and Eskom SAP 
South Africa paid 
approximately R100 million 
kickbacks disguised as 
commission to a Gupta-linked 
company 
Source: Researcher’s own construct 
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2.5 BOARD CHARACTERISTICS AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE EMPIRICAL 
EVIDENCE  
This section reviews empirical studies published on similar topics on the relationship 
between corporate governance compliance and company financial performance. 
2.5.1 Board independence and corporate performance 
The board of directors is grouped into executive and non-executive directors. Board 
independence measures the proportion of external directors on a company’s board.  To 
ensure that one individual or a group does not dominate the decision-making of the 
company, the King Report on corporate governance for South Africa 2009 states that ‘‘the 
corporate board should comprise a majority of non-executive members, most of whom 
should be independent’’ (King Report III, 2009). The report further explained the need to 
have a balance of power within the board by ensuring that majority of the members is non-
executive directors. However, the stewardship theory holds a different view by preferring the 
board to be dominated by executive directors whose in-depth knowledge of company 
operations and commitment presumably has a positive impact on company performance 
(Van Ness et al., 2010; Meyer & De Wet, 2013). 
  
The inclusion of external directors with no relations with the company on the board is 
essentially a monitoring tool in corporate governance, as put forward by the agency theory 
(Zakaria et al., 2014; Muniandy & Hillier, 2015; Dzingai & Fakoya, 2017). In addition, the 
independent non-executive directors have ties to outside connections that give easy access 
to valuable external resources which are highly likely to increase company performance, as 
proposed by the resource dependency theory (Meyer & De Wet, 2013). 
 
Muniandy and Hillier (2015) examined the relationship of 151 JSE-listed companies’ 
performance and board independence during the period of 2008 to 2012 and found that 
board independence was positively related to company performance as represented by 
ROE. Similarly, in Nigeria Paul and Sy (2015) studied the impact of board independence on 
microfinance banks’ performance over the period of 2011 to 2013 and found a positive 
significant relationship on EPS as a proxy for performance. Nonetheless, these results may 
not be comparable although they are similar and both countries are emerging markets. The 
sample for South Africa excluded financial institutions like banks while the Nigerian study did 
examine banks. 
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In addition, Pamburai et al. (2015) in South Africa found that the proportion external directors 
with no relations with the company had a positive effect on Tobin's Q, indicating that greater 
board independence may facilitates enhanced performance in companies. 
 
The above studies were supported by Liu, Miletkov, Wei and Yang (2015) in China, whose 
findings indicate a positive effect of board independence on performance on a sample of 
public companies for a period of 15 years from 1999 to 2012. Moreover, a handful of related 
studies performed by scholars concur with this viewpoint (Al-Manaseer et al., 2012; 
Adekunle & Aghedo, 2014 and Chen et al., 2015). The above studies’ findings indicate the 
synergistic effects of having external directors with no relations with the on board, as 
evidenced by increases in company performance. 
 
Wintoki, Linck and Netter (2012) in the USA found a strong positive relationship between 
board independence and company performance as represented by ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
Nonetheless, there was no causal relationship between board independence and company 
performance hence their evidence was inconclusive. This is supported by Fuzi, Halim and 
Julizaerma (2016), who applied data sets from diverse countries and found mixed 
relationships between percentage of external directors with no relations with the company 
and company performance.  However, Fuzi et al. (2016) hold the view that the appointment 
of more independent directors is mere regulatory compliance and does not enhance 
company performance. 
 
Dzingai and Fakoya (2017) analysed a sample of JSE-listed mining companies in South 
Africa for the period of 2010 to 2015 and found a weak positive association between board 
independence and ROE. Nonetheless, Dzingai and Fakoya (2017) recommend that South 
African companies comply with King IV as a moral imperative to meet stakeholders’ 
community and environmental needs. They maintain that the practice of good corporate 
governance attracts investors which in turn assists in raising the necessary finance for 
corporate growth sustainability and lays the foundation for improved company performance. 
 
Johl, Kaur and Cooper (2015) in Malaysia studied public companies for the year 2009 and 
found board independence did not have any effect on ROA as a representation for company 
performance. However, these results can be considered inconclusive and unreliable as the 
period of study was only one year. The extension of the study period may have yielded 
different results. Similarly, Detthamrong et al. (2017) in Thailand examined non-financial 
companies for the period of 2001 to 2014 and found board independence did not have any 
influence on ROE as a performance proxy. These findings are supported by Zakaria et al. 
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(2014) and Abdullah (2016) in Malaysia, who found an insignificant effect of board 
independence on return on assets and Tobin Q as proxy for company performance. 
  
Muravyev et al. (2016) in the UK studied the relationship between board independence and 
company performance as represented by ROE and Tobin’s Q using panel data during the 
period of 2002-2008 and found a strong positive relationship. However, this study was done 
in 2016 whereas the period of study is before 2010 hence the findings of this study may be 
invalid because of the change in economic focus in the country. 
 
Smit (2015) in South Africa during the period of 2008 to 2011 investigated small to medium 
enterprises listed on the JSE AltX. He examined whether the quality of reported earnings as 
represented by EPS had any relationship with the level of board independence and found no 
evidence of such a relationship. 
 
As seen from the above literature, the conclusions on the relationship between directors’ 
independence and company performance show inconsistency. A key difficulty in linking 
these studies is the endogeneity of variables used. 
 Size of the board and company performance 
Studies on the effects of board size on company performance yield three differing findings. 
Some studies show a positive relationship (Zakaria et al., 2014; Johl et al., 2015; Arora & 
Sharma, 2016), others show an inverse relationship (Pamburai et al., 2015; Al-Malkawi & 
Pillai, 2018; Paniagua et al., 2018) while others still show no relationship at all (Van Ness et 
al., 2010; Detthamrong et al., 2017, Wintoki et al., 2012). 
 
There is no consensus as to the exact board size acceptable in terms of South African law 
and the King III Report. In a different view, Yeung (2018) stresses that an ideal board size is 
between seven to ten members. Wintoki et al. (2012) reiterated the need for companies to 
maintain a sizable limit on the board of directors leading the company to ensure smooth 
coordination among the board.  
 
Pamburai et al. (2015) in South Africa concur with the view above by suggesting that smaller 
boards improve company performance through the members' increased capability to initiate 
tactical interactions. They found a significant inverse association between board size and 
company performance as represented by EVA. Similarly, stewardship theory contends that 
smaller boards encourage better contribution and social interconnection and facilitate 
unanimity on significant resolutions (Budiarso et al., 2018). Moreover, Garefalakis, Dimitras 
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and Lemonakis (2017), examining banks worldwide, hold a similar view insofar as small 
boards can function efficiently to reduce agency costs. 
  
Al-Malkawi and Pillai (2018) analysed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely, Bahrain, 
Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates using a panel regression 
model. They examined the impact of board size on company performance as represented by 
Tobin’s Q and ROA and found a negative and statistically significant relationship. These 
findings are consistent with agency theory which points to the inefficiencies of a larger board 
size, indicating that larger boards increase agency costs thus leading to overall inefficiency 
in operations due to slow decision-making processes. Other studies of the GCC countries 
(Naushad & Malik, 2015; Al-Matari, Swidi, Fadzil & Al-Matari, 2012) indicated a significant 
inverse relationship between board size and ROA as proxy for company performance. 
 
Paniagua, Rivelles and Sapena (2018) argue that smaller boards’ ability to maintain 
cohesiveness improves company performance.  Paniagua et al. (2018) examined the board 
size relationship to performance covering 1 207 companies from 59 nations for the period of 
2013 to 2015. They reported an inverse relationship between board size and performance as 
represented by ROE. They argued that large board size leads to ineffective communication 
among the members hence poor decisions were likely to be made. Their results concur with 
the agency theory that a large board increases agency cost. However, Al-Malkawi and Pillai 
(2018) point out that sharing skills and knowledge is a benefit of larger boards. The resource 
dependency theory maintains a similar view. 
 
Agency theorists, stakeholder theorists and resource dependency theorists prefer larger 
board (Meyer & De Wet, 2013), however, while agency theorists contend that larger boards 
reduce manipulation from self-centred managers, the resource dependency theorists and the 
stakeholder theorists view larger boards as a pool of quality and diversified resources in 
terms of talents and abilities as well as knowledge to cater for the needs of all stakeholders. 
 
Zakaria et al. (2014) in Malaysia studied public companies in the trading and services sector, 
covering a period of six years from 2005 to 2010. Their findings reveal that the size of the 
board has a direct significant effect on company performance as represented by ROA. 
Similarly, Arora and Sharma (2016) view large boards as advantageous as more ideas, skills 
and experience are pooled on the board which facilitates better strategies and decisions. 
 
According to Detthamrong et al. (2017) in Thailand, the governing body’s ability to supervise 
and direct managers is determined by the board size. Their hypothesis was based on the 
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assumption that larger boards provide a variety of skills and talents that enhance 
performance through careful decision-making procedures by bringing in diverse experience 
and knowledge. However, they found no relationship between board size and company 
performance as represented by ROE. 
 
Pucheta-Martínez (2015) argues that the size of the board is a factor in improving the 
performance of a company to a limited extent. These results are consistent with Dzingai and 
Fakoya (2017) who found a weak inverse association between board size and ROE after 
analysing a sample of JSE listed mining companies for the period of 2010 to 2015. 
 
While board size is arguably improving company performance, Cabrera-Suárez and Martín-
Santana (2015) contend that a balance should be drawn between the pros (supervision and 
advice) and the cons (coordination, control and decision-making issues) of a large board.  
 
The evidence on the effect of board size on company performance thus yields diverse 
findings, hence “the size of the board as a corporate governance mechanism has continued 
to receive a lot of attention” (Johl et al., 2015).  
 CEO tenure and corporate performance 
CEO tenure describes the number of years the CEO is serving the company in their current 
position. A long tenure is considered to be more than six years (Conte, 2018). Numerous 
corporate scandals in recent years have left the boards less tolerant of any form of 
misconduct or bad behaviour from CEOs. As such, “increased pressure from shareholders 
may compel boards to act against CEOs during times of poor performance, even if the bad 
performance is not the CEO’s fault” (Jenter & Kanaan, 2015:2159). A similar view is held by 
Conte (2018) insofar as performance declines lead to reputational losses for the CEO and 
increase the likelihood that the board of directors will replace the CEO.  However, the 
instability that comes from the exit and recruitment of CEOs can be unsettling, even 
damaging, to a company’s long-term goals and financial performance. 
 
Cornelli, Kominek and Ljungqvist (2013) show that in private companies, soft information (for 
example, subjective evaluation) plays a much larger role than hard information (for example, 
accounting performance) in boards’ decisions to fire CEOs.  In the USA, Dikolli, Mayew and 
Nanda (2014) found CEO tenure to have a positive effect on ROA as a proxy for company 
performance. They recommend that companies support governance practices of monitoring 
CEOs’ ability early in their careers to reduce any uncertainty about their ability to improve 
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company performance. They postulate that the longer the CEO is entrenched, the more 
likely the CEO will be acquainted with overall company objectives hence the more likely 
company performance will increase. 
 
Cornelli and Karakas (2015) in the United Kingdom found a positive significant association 
between CEO tenure and performance when a company is privatised. They conclude that 
more efficient control and extra internal information reduces reliance on immediate 
performance, hence the companies can afford CEOs’ extended tenure. 
 
Ahmadi et al. (2018) in France found an inverse effect of CEO tenure on company 
performance. Moreover, Falato, Kadyrzhanova and Lel (2014) studied European companies 
and found that listed companies are highly likely to fire CEOs during periods of bad 
performance than unlisted companies. They conclude that agency problems in listed 
companies may be less severe than in private companies because the stork markets play a 
key governance role.  
 
The analysis above indicates mixed results which show the need to further examination the 
relationship between CEO tenure and the performance of a company.  
 CEO duality and corporate performance  
Al-Malkawi and Pillai (2018) explain “CEO duality as a situation where the positions of a 
CEO and the chairman of the board are held by one person”. Al-Manaseer et al. (2012) view 
CEO duality as a signal of poor governance structure as it implies inside power domination 
that can hinder effective monitoring.  
  
CEO duality proponents argue it is useful in facilitating sustained leadership within the 
company as it sets clear-cut leadership and provides unique command for the formulation 
and implementation of strategy that increase company performance (Al-Manaseer et al., 
2012). Detthamrong et al. (2017) on the other hand argue that corporate failures such as 
those outlined in section 2.5.3 (WorldCom, Enron, Tyco, Maxwell Communication Group and 
Parmalat) are associated with CEO duality issues. 
 
Tshipa and Mokoaleli-Mokoteli (2015) examined JSE listed companies during the period of 
2002 to 2011 and found CEO duality to have a positive effect on ROA and Tobin’s Q as 
performance proxies. These findings support CEO duality, arguing that it facilitates faster 
decision-making in times of crisis and reduces the chain of command. In a similar study, 
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Fadun (2017) in Nigeria found CEO duality had a positive effect on ROA as proxy for 
company performance. However, an inverse relationship was observed with ROE, which 
makes the results inconclusive. Moreover, inconclusive evidence was found in prior studies 
by Gill and Mathur (2011) and Al-Hawary (2011). 
 .   
Al-Manaseer et al. (2012) examined the impact of CEO duality on the performance of banks 
in Jordan. The results indicate an inverse relationship between CEO duality and ROA and 
ROE as proxies for bank performance. Bhagat and Bolton (2008) report similar findings in 
the USA, showing that CEO duality has a negative effect on ROE as a proxy for company 
performance. These findings were consistent with the recommendation of King III which 
discourages CEO duality. 
 
However, in Thailand Detthamrong et al. (2017) found no effect of CEO duality on ROE and 
ROA as proxy for performance in a study conducted during the period of 2001 to 2014. 
Similarly, Adekunle and Aghedo (2014) in Nigeria found no substantial association between 
CEO duality and company performance as represented by ROA and PM.  These findings 
corroborate the evidence of Ayari and Regaieg (2018) in Tunisia which showed no 
association between CEO duality and company productivity as proxy for performance. In 
addition to the above, in India Arora and Sharma (2016) found CEO duality not to have a 
relationship with company performance as represented by ROA, ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
Therefore, CEO duality does not appear to be an element in determining company 
performance. Abbasi, Kalantari and Abbasi (2012) studied companies in the food industry in 
Iran and found that CEO duality has statistically immaterial relationship with the 
performance. 
 
The evidence above thus shows mixed results which indicate the need to further analyse the 
relationship between CEO duality and the performance of a company.  
 CEO remuneration and corporate performance  
According to Schymik (2018), CEOs are highly compensated during periods of good 
performance by the company; however, in down times CEOs may be prone to severe 
consequences. This view has resulted in concerns among policy makers and researchers 
that executive rewards are independent of company performance. However, high executive 
remuneration is argued to be a result of threatening competition for executive talent due to 
globalisation (Schymik, 2018). Moreover, the increase of executive remuneration is 
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presumed to arise from executives that are so powerful that they can stand firm themselves 
against warnings by shareholders. 
 
In Malaysia, Ismail, Yabai and Hahn (2014) studied public companies in the consumer 
product sector during 2006 to 2010 and found a significant direct association between 
remuneration of CEO and performance as denoted by ROA and ROE. They argued that 
companies need to encourage CEOs to work harder by paying a high salary in order to 
increase CEOs’ performance. Similarly, in Australia, Ndayisaba and Ahmed (2015) studied 
the top 200 companies on the Australian Stock Market from 2003 to 2013. The results 
indicate that CEO remuneration has a significant direct effect on performance. 
 
Bussin and Nel (2015) studied the relationship between CEO guaranteed total cost to 
company and company performance using South African companies in the retail and 
consumer goods sector from 2006 to 2011. Their findings indicate an inverse relationship 
between ROE and CEOs remuneration. These conclusions corroborate with the view of the 
agency theory that managers’ interests are seemingly not in tandem with the shareholders’ 
goals. This may be attributable to managerial power and the incapability of remuneration 
committees to direct an effective remuneration policy that will entice, retain and inspire 
CEOs.  However, agency problems may be minimised by proposing an ideal CEO 
remuneration package that motivates the CEO to perform in the best interests of 
shareholders. 
 Company size and corporate performance 
Larger companies have an advantage over their smaller counterparts as they are able to 
achieve efficiency and effectiveness through economies of scale and have access to 
cheaper finance as they have collateral security. Moreover, financial institutions are more 
likely to finance larger and established companies than smaller companies that are still 
entering the market. As a result, larger companies are likely to perform better. This view is 
supported by Pamburai et al. (2015) in South Africa whose study of JSE listed companies 
found a direct significant relationship between company size and performance as measured 
by EVA and ROA. On the other hand, inefficiencies of larger companies may also lead to 
poor performance. Research by Al-Matari et al. (2012) in Kuwait and Al-Malkawi and Pillai 
(2018) in United Arab Emirates also use company size as a control variable in their 
corporate governance and performance study and found a positive relationship between the 
size of company and performance. Contrary to the above arguments, however, Zakaria et al. 
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(2014) in UK found size to negatively influence firm performance, hence the bigger the size 
of the company the lower the performance. 
 
 Leverage and corporate performance 
Liao, Mukherjee and Wang (2015) viewed very high and very low debt ratios as an indication 
for weak governance. The challenge is for financial managers to strike a balance between 
low level debt and high-level debt to obtain an optimum capital structure that will enhance 
company growth and performance. Companies that comply with good governance principles 
are more likely to retain their debt levels diligently at the shareholders' preferred debt level 
(Liao et al., 2015). Pamburai et al. (2015) observed a significant inverse relationship 
between ROA and leverage, indicating that companies that use internal finances perform 
better than their counterparts that rely on debt. Therefore, the more leveraged the company, 
the riskier it is considered to be and the more prone to poor performance.  Zakaria et al. 
(2014) maintain that the higher the gearing ratio of the company, the lower its performance. 
 
2.6 LITERATURE GAP INDENTIFIED. 
Waweru (2014) points out that whilst there have been a number of studies in the past on the 
impact of corporate governance on company performance globally and locally, a number of 
these studies have been in advanced nations, and only a handful in developing countries. In 
addition, Tshipa et al. (2018a) reiterate the need to investigate corporate governance at 
country level as mixed or inconclusive results have been reported for developing nations. 
 
According to Dzingai and Fakoya (2017), there are very few studies in South Africa on the 
related topic. Furthermore, the conclusions on those studies were mixed, largely due to 
contradictions in the variables used to define corporate governance and company 
performance, small misrepresentative samples and estimation problems. A search of journal 
articles on the study topic for South African listed companies retrieved the following results: 
Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005), Chen et al.  (2009), Ntim (2013), Meyer 
and De Wet (2013), Waweru (2014), Tshipa and Mokoaleli-Mokoteli (2015), Mans-Kemp and 
Viviers (2015), Muniandy and Hillier (2015), Pamburai et al. (2015), Smit  (2015), Taljaard et 
al. (2015), Muchemwa et al. (2016), Dzingai and Fakoya (2017) and  Tshipa et al. 
(2018abc). These studies have numerous short comings, making it challenging to generalise 
the findings. This point to the need for further research on related topic focusing on specific 
industries and the King Report III governance reforms, specifically, the characteristics of 
company boards. 
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Some of the South African studies explored the effect of a single corporate governance 
variable on company performance. For example, Tshipa and Mokoaleli-Mokoteli (2015) and 
Taljaard et al. (2015) examined the influence of board dynamics on performance whilst Ntim 
(2013) explored the influence of board meetings on performance. Further, Muniandy and 
Hillier, (2015) and Smit (2015) focused on the effect of board independence on performance. 
Finally, Dzingai and Fakoya (2017) and Muchemwa et al. (2016) applied only two variables 
as proxy for corporate governance, namely, board size and board independence. The limited 
number of corporate governance variables used in the studies above signal the need for a 
study in South Africa with more corporate governance variables. 
 
Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005), Chen et al. (2009) and Munisi and 
Randøy (2013) adopted the Crédit Lyonnais Securities Asia’s Index as proxy for corporate 
governance. However, as this study was conducted in Asia, it may not applicable to South 
Africa as a result of traditional and institutional variations. Moreover, their results cannot be 
universally applied as the use of corporate governance index is particularly prone to 
subjectivity (Tshipa et al., 2018c). Furthermore, the sample sizes in all these studies were 
very small and may therefore not be a reliable representation of all public companies in 
South Africa. These discussions above further expound the need for a study that applies 
South African governance principles. 
 
Meyer and De Wet (2013), Muchemwa et al. (2016), Waweru (2014), Mans-Kemp and 
Viviers (2015), Muniandy and Hillier (2015) and Tshipa et al. (2018a-c) included companies 
from different economic sectors in their studies without focusing on a specific industry. 
Corporate governance applicability may vary across industries; therefore, the results may 
not be representative of one sector, which justifies the need for a study that examines a 
specific industry. 
  
Pamburai et al. (2015) and Meyer and De Wet (2013) covered single year and three-year 
periods respectively, which reduces the reliability of their results. 
 
The study of Tshipa et al. (2018a-c) lacked consistency in the applicability of the 
corporate governance reforms as the period covers both the first and second King 
reforms. More so, Klapper and Love (2004), Durnev and Kim (2005), Chen et al. (2009), 
Ntim (2013), Munisi and Randøy (2013), Waweru (2014), Tshipa and Mokoaleli-Mokoteli 
(2015) and Mans-Kemp and Viviers (2015) focused on outdated corporate governance 
practices of the first and second King reports due to the promulgation of the King Report 
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(2009) and the new companies Act No. 71 of 2008. This again calls for further research 
incorporating the subsequent corporate governance reforms of King III. 
 
Some recent studies (Muchemwa et al., 2016, Dzingai and Fakoya, 2017 and Tshipa et 
al., 2018abc) tried to address the limitations of earlier literature such as smaller sample 
sizes, outdated corporate governance practices and the short periods. However, like 
previous studies, they failed to consider industry dynamics and an estimation method that 
is robust to endogeneity issues. 
 
Below is a summary of the previous South African research on the study topic. The 
motivation of this study is to resolve the above-mentioned literature gap. 
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Table 2-5: Summary of South African research on CG and and company performance  
Research Results  
Author(s) Background Board size Board 
independence 
CEO Duality CEO 
Tenure 
CEO 
Compensation 
weaknesses 
Klapper & 
Love (2004) 
South Africa was 
part of the 14 
emerging 
countries studied. 
• The Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia’s Index for corporate governance 
• CG positively related to company performance. 
• Inconclusive evidence was found to determine the nature of relationship between CG 
and performance 
• Index used originated from 
Asia which may not be 
applicable to  South Africa 
Durnev & 
Kim (2005) 
South Africa was 
part of the 27 
countries studied. 
• The Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia’s Index for corporate governance 
• CG has a positive relationship with performance 
• Index used originated from 
Asia which may not be 
applicable to South Africa 
Chen et al. 
(2009) 
South Africa was 
part of the 17 
countries studied 
in emerging 
markets 
• The Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia’s Index for corporate governance 
• CG has a positive relationship with performance 
• Index used originated from 
Asia which may not be 
applicable to South Africa 
Ntim et al. 
(2013) 
• Period: 2002-
2007 
• 100 listed 
companies 
• Method: Panel 
data analysis 
Significant positive 
relationship with 
ROA and Tobin Q 
Not applicable Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable • No specific industry, CG 
applicability may vary across 
industry  
Meyer & De 
Wet (2013) 
• Sample from 
listed 
companies 
from 6 sectors 
• Period: 2010-
2012 
Significant positive 
relationship with 
EPS and Tobin-Q 
Significant 
positive 
relationship with 
EPS and 
Enterprise value 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable • Covers short period 
• Different sectors have different 
governance structures - results 
are not representative of one 
sector. 
Munisi & 
Randøy 
• Period: 2005-
2009 
• The Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia’s Index for corporate governance 
• CG has a positive relationship with performance 
• Index used originated from 
Asia which may not be 
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(2013) applicable to South Africa 
Waweru 
(2014) 
• Period: 2006-
2010 
• 50 largest JSE 
listed 
companies 
• Method: Panel 
data analysis 
 
• The CG Index was used by summing CG factors 
• CG positively related to company performance as measured by ROA 
• Results may not be applicable 
to smaller companies 
• Only one variable used as a 
measure of performance has 
been applied. 
• No specific industry, CG 
applicability may vary across 
industry 
Tshipa & 
Mokoaleli-
Mokoteli 
(2015) 
• Period 2002-
2011 
• JSE listed 
companies 
• Positive relationship  
• Performance measures: ROA & Tobin Q  
• Panel data analysis 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable • No specific industry, CG 
applicability may vary across 
industry 
Mans-Kemp 
& Viviers 
(2015) 
• Period 2002-
2012 
• Positive significant relationship with board gender and race diversity with EPS 
• Performance measures: EPS, NPM, ROE, ROA and total shareholders return (TSR) 
•  
• No specific industry, CG 
applicability may vary across 
industry 
Muniandy & 
Hillier (2015)  
• South African 
151 JSE listed 
companies 
from 2009-
2012 
Not applicable  Positive 
relationship with 
ROA & ROA 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable • Only one CG measure (board 
independence) which makes it 
limited to base a conclusion on 
these results. 
 
Pamburai et 
al.  (2015) 
• JSE listed 
companies  
• Period is 2012 
 
Negative and 
significantly 
associated to EVA 
Positive and 
significant 
relationship to 
Tobin’s Q. 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable • The study period only covers 
one year 
• No specific industry - not 
possible to conduct industry or 
sector analysis 
Smit (2015)  •  Period: 2008 -
2011 
• JSE listed 
companies on 
AltX 
 
Not applicable  No relationship 
with EPS 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable • Only one CG measure (board 
independence) which makes it 
limited to base a conclusion on 
these results 
• Only one variable used as 
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company performance  
Muchemwa 
et al. (2016) 
• Period:  2009 -
2012 
• JSE listed 
companies 
• Method: 
Multiple 
regression 
analysis 
• Performance 
measures: 
ROE, ROE & 
Tobin’s Q 
Mixed results with 
majority findings 
indicating no 
significant 
relationship 
Mixed results with 
majority findings 
indicating no 
significant 
relationship 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable • Only 2 variables used as proxy 
for CG. Study did not cater for 
other company level factors 
affecting performance 
• No specific industry, CG 
applicability may vary across 
industry. 
Dzingai & 
Fakoya 
(2017) 
• JSE listed 
companies in 
the mining 
• Period:  2010-
2015 
• Method: Panel 
data analysis 
Weak negative 
relationship with 
ROE 
Weak positive 
relationship with 
ROE 
Not 
applicable 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable • Only 2 variables used as proxy 
for CG 
• Only one variable as company 
performance. 
Tshipa et al. 
(2018a) 
• Method: Fixed 
effect 
generalised 
least squares 
regression 
• Period: 2002 -
2014 
• Performance 
measures: 
EPS & Share 
price 
Positive 
relationship  
Positive 
relationship 
Positive 
relationship 
Not 
applicable 
Not applicable • The study period 
encompasses the financial 
crisis of 2008, which may 
affect the results. 
• Lack of consistency. The 
1st and 2nd King reforms 
applied to the study 
• Sample drawn from nine 
industries; CG applicability 
may vary across industry. 
Source: Researcher’s own construct  
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2.7 SUMMARY 
Mixed results were found in earlier research exploring the relationship between corporate 
governance and company performance (Al-Manaseer et al., 2012; Conheady et al., 2015). 
Some studies did find a relationship between corporate governance, as represented by 
board characteristics and corporate performance while others found no relationship at all 
(Abid et al., 2018). However, it can be concluded that the majority of the studies that found a 
relationship, stressed the impact of board characteristics and structure on company 
performance without applicable clarification or confirmation as to why these relationships 
exist. The inconclusive nature of prior research thus creates a gap in the understanding of 
these interactions. The findings discussed above indicate ‘spurious relationships’, which has 
been defined by Abid et al. (2018) as a meaningless relationship without probable 
explanation and evidence to back that relationship. Previous literature has thus been 
unsuccessful in identifying the actual mechanism behind the relationships between corporate 
governance and company performance. 
  
The extensive literature review presented above points to a blurred and inconsistent 
association between board characteristics and performance. This therefore provides strong 
rationale for the present study within the South African economic context. The present study 
differs from prior research insofar as it compares company performance with the board 
characteristics, who are the key drivers of corporate governance.  
 
Although evidence from literature is inconclusive in suggesting that good corporate 
governance practices may lead to improved corporate performance, companies are 
nonetheless encouraged to comply with the principles of corporate governance in order to 
promote stakeholder needs (Dzingai & Fakoya, 2017). 
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Chapter 3 Research methodology 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter describes the processes and techniques adopted in the research for data 
gathering, data presentation and data inquiry in order to answer the research question and 
achieve the study objective. According to Kumar (2011) superior research results are 
achieved through systematic problem-solving. Systematic research entails a well-planned 
and organised process that involves finding the research gap in the domain of prevailing 
evidence on the study topic selected, followed by thoughtfully choosing a research design 
and managing the complete research process (Creswell & Poth, 2017). 
 
Kumar (2011) defines research as the impartial and methodical procedure of gathering, 
recording, analysing and interpreting data to resolve decision-making problems. For the 
purposes of this study, stakeholders require corporate governance and performance 
information for strategic and financial planning. It is ordinarily expensive, slow-moving and 
tedious to ensure corporate governance compliance in a company. Investors and 
stakeholders are therefore concerned with understanding the rewards for appropriate 
adoption and implementation of corporate governance practices. 
 
3.2 RESEARCH PROBLEM AND QUESTION 
The research problem on which this study is founded is explained below. The problem is the 
diffusion and dilution of equity ownership of listed companies which has seen more and 
more “separation of ownership and control” (Ferreira, Ornelas & Turner 2015:1). The 
managers who have been assigned the responsibility of controlling and directing companies 
on behalf of owners are prone to pursuing their own interests instead of those of 
shareholders and other stakeholders (Akeem et al., 2014). These situations have led to 
rising agency costs and significant effects on company performance. Constraints emanating 
from lack of good governance practices have been the key factor affecting company 
performance in emerging countries such as South Africa. This view is said to have led to the 
collapse and unforeseen corporate failures in South Africa. However, despite the response 
by the regulatory authorities to curb corporate failures by issuing the King reports to 
encourage company accountability, transparency and responsibility, the collapse of 
corporates due to poor governance continues to persist. These corporate failures have led to 
the notion that existing corporate governance principles have failed to effectively control the 
behaviour of managers – this is reflected in the frequency with which boards have been 
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negligent in their governance oversight role. Accordingly, this has led to questions as to the 
sufficiency and effectiveness of governance principles on board structures (Zakaria et al., 
2014). It is against this backdrop that this research study examines the influence of the 
characteristics of the board charged with the custodianship of companies, and the 
performance of those companies. 
  
Moreover, no similar studies have to date been conducted on public companies on the 
construction and building materials sector of the JSE. Prior research and debate on similar 
study topic has been conducted in developed countries (Dzingai & Fakoya, 2017) and the 
findings of these studies were generally mixed and spurious (Afrifa & Tauringana, 2015). To 
this end, a gap exists in the relationship between the board characteristics and performance 
of South African companies. 
 
The main research question can therefore be formulated as follows: 
 
→ Is there any relationship between corporate governance, as represented by 
characteristics of boards of directors, and the financial performance of public 
companies on the construction and building materials sector of JSE in South Africa? 
 
3.3 RESEARCH DESIGN AND APPROACH 
In pursuance of addressing the research question and the research objective, the research 
design which sets out the research strategy is defined to ensure proper integration of the 
study components (Creswell & Poth, 2017). The study uses a quantitative analysis design 
derived from a panel regression analysis model following a positivist approach. 
 
The population of companies listed in the construction and building materials sector selected 
for the six-year period from 2011 to 2016 is small; however, the design chosen for the study 
will allow meaningful statistical analysis by adopting panel data that expand data 
observations.  
3.3.1 Research paradigm 
The decision on what methodology to apply in a study stems from the selection of the 
research paradigm that informs the study. A paradigm is a “systematic procedure that 
formerly guides the way a problem can be resolved” (Granlund & Lukka, 2017:66). 
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The research paradigm is best understood by first considering its framework, which is made 
up of the research ontology, epistemology and methodology. Ontology is a philosophical 
view of the researcher which is based on fact while epistemology is how a researcher 
examines the information which will define the method of research. 
 
There are five research paradigms according to Bless, Higson-Smith and Kagee (2013): 
▪ Positivism is consistent with quantitative research that involves hypothesis testing to 
explain reality as it is mainly dependent on quantitative data. This paradigm focuses 
on the validity and reliability of tools applied. (Bless et al., 2013). 
▪ Interpretivism is consistent with qualitative research that is used to get a viewpoint 
from an individual perspective.  
▪ A pragmatist approach evaluates ideas or views in terms of their ability to be applied 
practically in resolving problems. 
▪ Subjectivism “is a paradigm whose ontology is reality is what we perceive to be real 
and knowledge is purely a matter of perception” (Scotland, 2012:11). 
▪ A critical paradigm “is where there is reality that is constantly under internal 
influence thus the reality and knowledge are both influenced by power and socially 
constructed” (Scotland, 2012:11). 
According to Granlund and Lukka (2017), quantitative research is centred on arithmetic data 
that can be scrutinized statistically whilst qualitative research uses non-arithmetic data.  As a 
result, this study follows a quantitative approach and a positivist paradigm to answer the 
research question. A positivist paradigm examination involves explanation, prediction, 
control and causality by empirically presenting and revealing reality. Positivists believe that 
the reality is quantitatively given and is measurable in units which are autonomous of the 
investigator and the investigation instrument.  
3.3.2 Research method 
A research method is a description of the techniques used in data gathering and scrutiny to 
address the research question (Al-Malkawi & Pillai, 2018). Panel data regression was 
adopted because the research data was quantitative in nature, consisting of both time series 
and cross-sectional data. To analyse the data, a blend of a quantitative approach and a 
correlation and panel regression was applied. Therefore, the research used multiple 
regressions as a method of analysis and Generalised Least Squares (GLS) as the method of 
estimation. GLS was chosen for its robustness in dealing with the effects of heterogeneity 
and endogeneity (Nguyen et al., 2014; Aroora & Sharma, 2016; Al-Malkawi & Pillai, 2018). 
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Moreover, in order to reduce endogenity, which is a common problem in corporate 
governance research, the corporate governance variables were lagged one year as the 
present company performance may be determined by prior corporate governance settings 
(Wintoki et al., 2012). 
 Research instrument 
The study is based on numerical measurements of secondary data. Similar studies that used 
this numerical secondary data in emerging markets include Waweru (2014), Dzingai and 
Fakoya (2017), Haruna et al. (2018) and Padachi et al. (2018). Tshipa et al. (2018c) 
recommend panel data as the most appropriate technique to capture disparities over time.  
 
The ability of panel data analysis to control for heterogeneity and endogeneity issues permits 
for the control of distinct explicit effects, which are generally not visible and may be 
correlated with other independent data sets encompassed in the specification of the 
relationship between board of directors’ characteristics and company performance.  
 
For the purposes of this study, secondary data was gathered from electronic sources such 
as journal articles, press statements, books and websites to conduct a detailed literature 
review. 
 
In this study, company integrated reports were the units of analysis. These were downloaded 
from company websites for the period 2011 to 2016. Financial data was collected from each 
report as published in a standardised format. Standardised financial data is easily 
comparable with accuracy between the tested companies. Secondary data sources are 
frequently utilized in corporate governance and financial performance researches. 
Nonetheless, data is not always obtainable in readily usable format. The data must be 
transformed into the necessary format: “data transformation refers to the process of 
converting the original form of data to a format that is more suitable to achieve the research 
objective(s) of a specific study” (Kumar, 2011:102). To carry out the analysis, data was 
extracted from audited integrated reports and processed to variables as per their definitions 
and stored in Excel file format before importing it into panel linear regression models. Data 
analysis for this was is done with the aid of the e-Views software programme. 
 
3.4 SOURCES AND COLLECTION OF DATA 
The sample of 12 companies selected for the study was limited to South African public 
companies on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange in the construction and building materials 
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sector. The use of listed companies is supported by prior studies such (Waweru, 2014; 
Dzingai & Fakoya, 2017; Muchemwa et al., 2016). The convenience sampling techniques 
was applied in the selection of companies as applied by prior authors (Meyer & De Wet, 
2013; Purag et al., 2016) depending on the accessibility of the data variables for the period 
of six years from 2011 to 2016. This period is between the publishing of the third King and 
the fourth King Codes of Corporate Governance in South Africa. However, for the purposes 
of this study the companies selected must meet two criteria - being listed on the JSE and 
being in the construction and building materials sector. 
 
The identification of the relevant variables is part of the data collection process. While some 
of the variables like ROA and ROE were somewhat simple to measure, others such as 
corporate governance measures were more challenging to expound and measure. However, 
the study utilised the principles of King III to define corporate governance measures as the 
period of study falls in the King III setting. 
3.4.1 Independent variables: Corporate governance board characteristics 
The basis for the selection of the independent variables was informed by the existing 
literature and was therefore based on the selected five board characteristics according to 
King III, the JSE listing requirements and the Company’s Act of 2008. 
 
Board independence 
Board independence was practically measured by considering independent directors as a 
percentage of the total number of directors. This information is in the integrated reports 
provided by the relevant database, such as the respective company websites or Bloomberg. 
This information was hand-collected from each company’s respective audited published 
integrated report. 
 
This measurement is consistent with Liao et al. (2015) who defined board independence as 
the degree of outside representation of directors on the board who are not company 
executives. Liao et al. (2015) explain that boards with greater representation from outsiders 
are highly probable to safeguard shareholders’ interests and be independent. Padachi 
(2018) holds a similar view that strong board independence expedites objective, partial and 
constructive conclusions to the boardroom to ensure all stakeholder needs are met. King III 
principle 2.18 recommends that “the board should comprise a balance of power; with a 
majority of non-executive directors and that the majority of non-executive directors should be 
independent” (King Report III, 2009:25). This variable is consistent with existing literature 
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(Al-Manaseer et al., 2012; Adekunle & Aghedo, 2014; Chen et al., 2015; Muniandy & Hillier, 
2015; Zakaria et al., 2014; Abdullah, 2016; Purag et al., 2016; Dzingai & Fakoya, 2017). 
 
Board size  
The actual total sum of directors sitting on the board describes board size. The size of the 
board may influence agency costs, especially in companies with large boards, which may in 
turn affect company performance (Su & Sauerwald, 2018). King III does not prescribe to a 
precise figure concerning the size of the board nevertheless recommends all boards ought to 
ponder whether its size, diversity and demographics make it effective. The variable is 
consistent with earlier literature (Zakaria et al., 2014; Johl et al., 2015; Abdullah, 2016; 
Mandal & Al-ahdal, 2018; Su & Sauerwald, 2018; Paniagua et al., 2018). 
 
CEO tenure  
CEO tenure refers to the “number of years the CEO is in position”, as stated by Conte. 
(2018:56). The third King report did not provide specific tenure for CEOs; however, it 
recommended that the board ensure succession procedures of senior executives including 
the CEO. The following prior studies are consistent with the use of this variable (Cornelli et 
al., 2013; Falato et al., 2014; Cornelli & Karakas, 2015; Fadun, 2017; Ahmadi et al., 2018).   
 
CEO-Chairman duality  
CEO duality is a situation where the CEO of a company and chairman of the board 
responsibilities are simultaneously assigned to single individual. Splitting up the duties of 
CEO and chairman is a way of separating management and control. King III principle 2.15 
recommends that “the board should elect a chairman who is an independent non-executive 
director. It also stipulates that the CEO of the company should not fulfil the role of chairman 
of the board” (King Report III, 2009:24). The use of this variable is consistent with earlier 
studies (Abdullah, 2016; Detthamrong et al., 2017). The dummy variable was equal to 0 if 
the two functions were separated or 1 if the functions were held by one individual. 
 
CEO remuneration 
CEO remuneration includes guaranteed salary income and benefits received as a result of 
service to the company during the period under study. However, it does exclude 
performance-based remuneration. The King III report principle 2.25 identified “remuneration 
systems as a governance point requiring greater transparency and alignment to the long-
term strategies of companies” (King Report III, 2009:30). The use of this variable is 
consistent with Schymik (2018), Bussin and Nel (2015), Ndayisaba and Ahmed (2015) and 
67 
Ismail et al. (2014). Liao et al. (2015:173) argue that while incentive remuneration is 
perceived to assist in matching CEOs’ interest with the stockholders, “it is also believed to 
lead to so much power that CEOs are able to use the company to further their own interests 
rather than the interests of stockholders”. 
 
3.4.2 Dependent variable: Company performance 
The third King Report clearly states that “without reasonable profit levels, it is doubtful that 
stakeholders would have an enduring interest in a company” (Mans-Kemp & Viviers, 
2014:25). 
 
Accounting-based performance measures  
Annual reports contain the financial information from which accounting-based performance 
measures are collected. These focus on company profitability, reflecting the history of the 
company’s performance. These measures were extensively adopted in earlier studies 
including those on the association of corporate governance and financial performance 
(Mans-Kemp & Viviers, 2015; Smit, 2015; Arora & Sharma, 2016; Muravyev et al., 2016; 
Fadun, 2017; Ahmadi et al., 2018). 
 
The measures of company financial performance selected are essential to best reflect 
boards’ effectiveness in achieving company objectives. The below is an outline of profitability 
ratios selected as the performance measures for this study. 
 
Net profit margin (NPM) 
NPM is a measure of net profit for the year, divided by total revenue for the year. The 
variable was used in earlier studies by Halimatusadiah et al. (2015) and Mans-Kemp and 
Viviers (2015). 
 
Return on equity (ROE) 
ROE is a measure of net profit for the year divided by shareholder equity for the year. This 
variable was also used by Halimatusadiah et al. (2015); Mans-Kemp & Viviers, 2015; Arora 
& Sharma, 2016; Muravyev et al., 2016; Fadun, 2017).  
 
Return on assets (ROA)  
ROA describes how efficiently the company’s total resources are being used to generate 
profit and reduce costs in support of shareholders’ interest. ROA is calculated as a 
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proportion of operating profit to total assets by Arora and Sharma (2016). The variable wss 
used as a performance measure in prior literature (Halimatusadiah et al., 2015; Mans-Kemp 
& Viviers, 2015; Pamburai et al., 2015; Purag et al., 2016; Arora & Sharma, 2016; Fadun, 
2017 and Mandal & Al-ahdal, 2018). 
3.4.3 Control variables 
Control variables serve “to reduce potential bias of omitted variables” (Tshipa, 2017:126). 
Company performance is determined numerous elements other than the selected 
independent corporate governance measures. Abid et al. (2018) identified resource 
management, decision-making and resources as effective polices and key contributing 
factors to company performance. The interaction between these various factors determines 
the survival or downfall of companies. The company size and leverage has been adopted as 
the control determinants of financial performance in this research study.  
 
Size of the company (Size) 
The effects of different size variations on performance variables were controlled by including 
the size variable in the model. Company size is described as the natural log of the total 
assets (Al-Manaseer et al., 2012; Mandal & Al-ahdal, 2018). This variable is log transformed 
to control for effects of skewedness. The use of this variable as a control variable in studies 
on related study topic is consistent earlier literature (Al-Manaseer et al., 2012; Munisi & 
Randøy, 2013; Muniandy & Hillier, 2015; Pamburai et al., 2015; Arora & Sharma, 2016; Su & 
Sauerwald, 2018; Purag et al., 2016; Mandal & Al-ahdal, 2018; Mariappan & Thyagarajan, 
2018). 
 
Leverage (Debt Ratio)  
In order to control for financing structure disparities among the selected companies, leverage 
was selected as a control variable. High leverage reduces the free cash flow of a company 
hence debt ratios are used as a control variable as they influence company performance. 
Debt ratio is a measure of leverage being used by the company and is calculated as a 
fraction of total debt to total assets. The use of this ratio is consistent with past studies 
(Munisi & Randøy, 2013; Pamburai et al., 2015; Abdullah, 2016; Arora & Sharma, 2016). 
 
3.5 TARGET POPULATION 
The target population of the study is limited to South African public companies in the 
construction and building materials sector of the JSE during the period of 2011 to 2016. To 
facilitate the comparison of similar companies, companies listed within the same sector were 
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selected, as the impact of board dynamics on company performance may differ from industry 
to industry (Dzingai & Fakoya, 2017). Similarly, Muniandy and Hillier (2015) concur that 
companies in the same industry have similar corporate governance structures. Specific 
exclusions were those companies which were either liquidated or suspended from the JSE. 
Based on these modifications, the sample size equated to 12. 
Table 3-1: Summary research data 
Total public companies on the JSE construction and buildings materials 
sector 
18 
Subtract: Companies liquidated during the period of study 1 
Subtract: Companies suspended from the JSE during the period of study 2 
Subtract: Companies without full data set publicly published during the 
period of study 
3 
Sample of companies with full data set 12 
Source: Researcher’s own construct. 
 
3.6 SAMPLING 
The sample consisted of 12 public companies on the JSE in the South African construction 
and building materials sector. Published annual reports for the sampled companies were 
available over the time period beginning on 1 January 2011 and ending on 31 December 
2016. The relationship between variables over this period was studied and tracked 
longitudinally, from when the third King Report became effective on the first of March 2010 to 
the publication of forth King Report in 2016. As a result, the search only used data after 2010 
and before April 2017 when King III was in effect. The unit of analysis was the application of 
the recommended corporate governance board of directors’ characteristics on as suggested 
by King III. The recommendations of King III were selected as that was the governing report 
effective during the period of study.  
 
3.7 PANEL REGRESSION MODEL SPECIFICATION 
The ordinary least square panel regression method was used to analyse the data which was 
panel in nature (Waweru, 2014; Zakaria et al., 2014). The ability of the panel data estimation 
framework to control for heterogeneity and endogeneity informed its selection for this 
research. In addition, panel data analysis enables a cross-sectional time series analysis 
which can make allowance for wider data sets. This research covered a period of 6 years 
with 7 independent variables and 12 companies, consisting of 72 observations. Data of 12 
70 
different companies was analysed in e-Views as per the models below. These models were 
consistent with the research of Afrifa and Tauringana (2015), Kara and Erdur (2015) and 
Dzingai and Fakoya (2017). 
 
3.7.1 Descriptive statistics 
Kumar (2011:55) defined descriptive statistics as measures “that are used to describe, 
characterise and summarise the gathered data”. These statistics include measures like the 
arithmetic mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard deviation and measures of central 
tendency. Descriptive statistics are useful in illustrating the nature of the data file as well as 
forming the foundation for other analytical techniques (Creswell & Poth, 2017). 
3.7.2 Pooled model  
The pooled regression model is a technique that is run in panel data that ignores the 
individual specific effects of the variables tested, assumes a zero mean and a constant 
variance. The coefficients of the pooled ordinary least square regression are fixed over time 
periods. Whilst Nhleko (2014) believes the observations are independent and the model is 
simple to apply, Permani (2009) cautions against applying the model in situations where 
observations are not identically dispersed. In light of the above view, the fixed and the 
random effects models were also considered. 
3.7.3 Random effects (RE) model 
The random effects model assumes there are differences between individual random 
observations that are selected from a given distribution (Torres-Ryna, 2013). Thus, the 
model allows for individual variables effects when the differences are constant over time. 
However, these individual effects are assumed not correlated to the independent variables. 
The model assume that variables varies across companies (cross- sectionally) and assumes 
a different intercept for every variable in the model. 
3.7.4 Fixed effects (FE) model  
The model is well-suited for examining the causes of changes within the companies tested 
when it is assumed that something within the companies might prejudice or mislead the 
results of the variables (Wooldridge, 2013). The model accords the overlooked effects to be 
randomly correlated with the independent variables in each time period (Torres-Ryna, 2013). 
The model also assumes that the intercept coefficients are constant and do not vary over the 
independent variables and considers the heterogeneity of the variables in the model.  
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3.7.5 Redundant fixed effects test 
The test was done to determine if heterogeneity needed to be accounted for. This test also 
helped to choose the best model from the models selected above. The assumption was that 
all the companies were the same and that the pooled regression model was the appropriate 
model (dummies are zero). However, that assumption would be rejected if probability value 
of the cross-section or the period Chi-square was to be below 5%.  
3.7.6 Hausman test 
According to Kara and Erdur (2015:33), “the Hausman test was applied in order to determine 
whether the fixed effects model or random effects model is more appropriate in estimating 
the models established” in the research. The null hypothesis is that the random effects 
model is the appropriate model whilst the alternative hypothesis is that the fixed effects 
model is the appropriate model (Wooldridge, 2013). The null hypothesis would be rejected if 
probability value was below 5%, thus the fixed effects method can be applied. 
3.8 DIAGNOSTIC TESTS 
Kara and Erdur (2015) argued for the necessity to test the final results of the models for 
problems of heteroscedasticity, abnormal distribution and serial correlation. Therefore, the 
normality, serial correlation and Wald tests were run the on the final results of this research. 
3.9 RELIABILITY OF DATA 
Financial data applied in the study was extracted from the audited annual integrated reports 
available on individual company websites; this is similar to earlier studies like Tshipa et al. 
(2018abc). The data was reliable and was obtained from sources that were verifiable. This 
was to ensure the integrity of data. For purposes of this study, it can be concluded that the 
data was dependable and valid.  
3.10 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Data for the research was recorded accurately and fully without manipulating it into a 
suitable trend for the research. The research results were documented honestly without any 
distortion or fabrication. 
 
Full recognition was given to original authors with enough details in citation and in the 
reference for further reading.  
 
3.11 DELIMITATIONS 
The following demarcations have been applied in the study to meet the study objective: 
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▪ This study is focused on South African companies listed on the JSE in the 
construction and building materials sector only. 
▪ During the period of study which is 2011 to 2016 only 12 companies were neither 
liquidated nor suspended on the JSE listing in the construction and building 
materials sector. This sample was sufficient to obtain results within the given 
period of study. 
 
3.12 SUMMARY 
To achieve research goals, the procedure of selecting the right research strategy is an 
important step in carrying out any research. The chapter clarified and validated the research 
methodology, including the scope, approach, model, method and the instrument of the 
research. The research followed a quantitative approach to respond to the research 
questions and meet the research objectives since the data was measurable. 
 
The study used secondary data available, namely, the audited integrated reports available 
on the individual company websites. A sample of 12 public companies in the construction 
and building materials sector of the JSE was be tested for the period of 2011 to 2016. 
 
Company performance as the dependent variable was tested against the independent 
variables as represented by board characteristics whilst the size and leverage of the 
company was applied as control variables. The pooled ordinary least squares, the random 
effects and the fixed effects are the panel regression models that were applied as the 
research model. The panel model has the advantage of controlling for individual 
heterogeneity. 
 
The ethical considerations were adhered to throughout the study to facilitate accuracy and 
objectivity of the results. The primary target of the research findings is South Africa as the 
settings of the study is within the South African context. However, the findings may be used 
to explain corporate governance issues in similar emerging markets. 
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Chapter 4 Research findings and interpretation 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The chapter affords a detailed scrutiny, interpretation and explanation of the research 
findings by answering the research question. As concluded in Chapter 2, literature reviews 
disclose ambiguous evidence on the influence of board characteristics on company 
performance. This study identified the board characteristics that are significant in influencing 
performance of South African public companies in the construction and building materials 
sector of the JSE during the period of 2011 to 2016. 
 
4.2 PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS 
Numerous tests were conducted before the regression analysis (Pamburai et al., 2015; 
Tshipa et al., 2018c). 
 Variables descriptive statistics   
Descriptive statistics indicate the data distributional properties. It is important to run a 
descriptive statistic test on the data variables before applying any data modelling technique 
in order to detect any possible outliers in the data. Table 4-1 below is an illustration of the 
descriptive statistics for the sample of captured panel data for 12 companies for six years 
making 72 observations in total. In corporate governance related research, descriptive 
statistics have been widely used (Meyer & De Wet, 2013; Tshipa et al., 2018abc; Yeung, 
2018). 
 
Table 4-1 below shows the average board size among the selected 12 companies listed in 
the construction and building materials sector is around 9.28 which fall within the range of 
ideal board size. As suggested by Yeung (2018), the impeccable size of the board should 
range from seven to ten members. The average board size as per this study is slightly lower 
than the results of Tshipa and Mokoaleli-Mokoteli (2015) of 10.28. This may be explained by 
different industries studied and the length of the study period. Tshipa and Mokoaleli-Mokoteli 
(2015) studied the top ten industries including the financial services sector on the JSE for a 
period of ten years from 2002 to 2011. The companies tested improved their boardroom 
composition during the period of study by increasing the number of board members as well 
board independence as per below. 
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During the study period, about 56% of board members were non-salaried directors with no 
indirect or direct interest in the company. The board independence average (56%) and 
maximum (90%) follows the third King report principle which recommends that “the majority 
of board members should be independent non-executive directors” (King Report III, 
2009:25). This average board independence was anticipated, as an increasing number of 
listed companies are becoming acquainted with King Reports principles. 
 
An average of 1% CEO duality from the sample is highly satisfactory and acceptable. It is an 
indication that companies in the sample are complying with the King recommendations on 
discouraging CEO duality to promote board independence. However, these results are 
contrary to the stewardship theory which supports dual roles of the CEO to facilitate an 
integrated leadership structure that functions effectively through improved coordination and 
clear-cut channels of command. 
 
The length of time that the CEO was in position averaged around five years, with the lowest 
being one year and highest being fifteen. The third King report did not specify the length of 
tenure for CEOs; it only recommends that the board should ensure succession procedures 
of senior executives including CEO. 
 
In terms of remuneration, the sample recorded an average of R 3.15 million, with the 
minimum being R479 000 and the maximum being R8.567 million. 
 
Table 4.1 indicates average net profit margin and return on assets as 6% and 4% 
respectively. Notwithstanding the general increase in corporate governance compliance 
trends, the average return on equity was zero, indicating that on average the shareholders’ 
wealth was not being maximised. The companies that were unable to make a profit need to 
familiarise the directors and executive management with King guidelines and to integrate 
these principles into their operations. 
  
With respect to leverage, the sample figures varied from 0% to 128% with a mean of 56%, 
indicating that on average the companies were highly financed by debt. This is acceptable 
as the industry requires large capital outlays. 
 
A positive trend in corporate governance compliance was observed following the introduction 
of listing rules, challenging public companies on the JSE to report on their corporate 
governance practices as per the third King report. Moreover, the directors became 
knowledgeable with King principles and their significance. This observation reveals 
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encouraging prospects for financiers who contemplate corporate governance defiance in 
public companies in the construction and building materials sector of the JSE.  
Table 4-1: Variables’ descriptive statistics 
Variable Symbol Average Max. Min. Standard 
deviation 
Skew-
ness 
Kurtosis Observ- 
ations 
Board 
Independence 
BIND 0.56 0.90 0.20 0.17 -0.11 2.08 72 
Board Size BSIZE 9.28 15.00 5.00 2.56 0.33 2.42 72 
CEO Duality CEODUO 0.01 1.00 0.00 0.12 8.31 1.91 72 
CEO Tenure CEOTEN 5.14 15.00 1.00 3.63 0.81 2.82 72 
CEO 
Remuneration 
CEOREM 3 150.43 8 567.00 479.00 1 456.06 1.02 4.61 72 
Company 
Size 
COSIZE 8.23 10.34 5.55 1.41 -0.41 1.97 72 
Company 
Leverage 
LEV 0.57 1.28 0.00 0.25 0.51 3.93 72 
Net Profit 
Margin 
NPM 0.06 2.00 -0.41 0.30 5.15 31.56 72 
Return on 
Assets 
ROA 0.04 0.52 -0.23 0.09 1.45 14.21 72 
Return on 
Equity 
ROE 0.00 0.23 -2.43 0.33 -5.69 40.87 72 
Source: Researcher’s results from e-Views  
 
 
 Normality analysis 
Montgomery, Jennings and Kulahci (2015:266) refer to “skewness as the degree of 
unevenness which can be used to explain the normality of the data set”. Positive skewness 
is achieved when the mean is higher than the median. This indicates that the probability 
distribution becomes positively skewed. Brooks (2014) points that the higher the standard 
deviation of the variable (measured as average distance from the mean), the higher the risk 
of the variable. Correia, Flynn, Uliana and Wormald (2010:3-2) describe risk as “the chance 
that an outcome is different from the expected outcome”. Table 4.1 shows positive skewness 
in all other variables except board independence and company size.  
 
 Variable inferential statistics   
Table 4-2 displays the relationship matrix for the variables. Even though the table displays a 
number of statistically substantial relationships among the variables, collinearity problems 
are not imminent as the correlation coefficients are fairly trivial. 
 
As per Table 4-2, CEO tenure indicates a moderately negative significant negative 
correlation with board size. In addition, company size shows moderately direct and 
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statistically substantial correlation with the independence and size of the board. It also 
displays a moderately inverse and statistically substantial relationship between company 
size and CEO tenure. Moreover, leverage indicates weak positive and highly substantial 
correlation with board independence and company size. NPM reveal a weak negative but 
statistically significant relationship with board independence, however, it shows moderately 
negative but statistically substantial correlation with leverage. ROA affirms a weak negative 
and statistically substantial correlation with leverage and shows a weak direct and 
substantial relationship with NPM. ROE indicates a weak direct and statistically substantial 
correlation with company size and ROA while indicating a weak inverse and statistically 
substantial correlation with leverage. 
Table 4-2: Correlation of variables 
Correlation         
Probability BIND  BSIZE  CEODUO  CEOTEN  COSIZE  LEV  NPM  ROA  ROE  
BIND  1.000000         
 -----          
          
BSIZE  0.176728 1.000000        
 0.1375 -----         
          
CEODUO  0.095430 0.033747 1.000000       
 0.4252 0.7784 -----        
          
CEOTEN  -0.024018 -0.448935 -0.136334 1.000000      
 0.8413 0.0001 0.2535 -----       
          
COSIZE  0.516141 0.571691 0.094938 -0.530416 1.000000     
 0.0000 0.0000 0.4276 0.0000 -----      
          
LEV  0.367506 0.173905 0.060301 -0.086520 0.326462 1.000000    
 0.0015 0.1440 0.6148 0.4699 0.0051 -----     
          
NPM  -0.279112 0.041573 -0.012371 -0.025573 -0.127556 -0.419704 1.000000   
 0.0176 0.7288 0.9179 0.8311 0.2856 0.0002 -----    
          
ROA  -0.111786 -0.009237 0.051393 -0.007154 -0.038936 -0.298396 0.393929 1.000000  
 0.3499 0.9386 0.6681 0.9524 0.7454 0.0109 0.0006 -----   
          
ROE  0.183730 0.152821 0.058477 0.067951 0.301341 -0.265130 0.205329 0.248354 1.000000 
 0.1224 0.2000 0.6256 0.5706 0.0101 0.0244 0.0836 0.0354 -----  
Source: Researcher’s results from Eviews. 
 
4.3 REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
If the intercept was the same during the period of the research, the pooled regression model 
would be adopted. Moreover, the research executed both fixed and random effect models 
assuming contrasting intercepts for each company on the sample. 
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 Pooled OLS  
Table below presents the effects of board characteristics on the sampled companies’ 
performance. This model may not be the best for the reason that it assumes all 12 
companies in the sample are the same and denies the individuality that may exist among the 
12 companies (Montgomery et al., 2015). Moreover, this model assumes that the coefficients 
including intercepts are the same for the dataset variables. 
Table 4-3: Pooled OLS - Company performance measured by ROE 
Variable C  BIND BSIZE CEO 
DUO  
CEO 
TEN 
CEO 
REM 
COSIZE LEV F-stat R-Sq 
Coefficient -
1.1323 
0.1080 0.0089 0.2219 0.0035 1.2223  0.1441 -0.6005 4.8266 0.3455 
P-value 0.0003 0.692 0.608 0.4483 0.0046* 0.7193 0.0007* 0.0001* 0.0002* 
 
Note: * indicate significance at 5% level of confidence  
Source: Researcher’s results from e-Views  
 
The F-statistics value of 4.82 with corresponding significant p value (0.0002) of less than 5% 
shows that altogether, the board characteristics are statistically significant in explaining 
variations in company performance as represented by ROE under the pooled model. The R-
squared coefficient figure of 0.3455 indicates that the board characteristics variables 
altogether account for 34.55% variation on return on equity in the pooled model. 
 
In addition, a significant inverse relationship exists between leverage and ROE. A direct 
significant relationship exists between company size and ROE. Moreover, CEO tenure has a 
substantial direct relationship with ROE. 
 
However, board independence, CEO remuneration, CEO duality and board size have a 
coefficient with p values that are above 5%, meaning that they are all insignificant in 
explaining the variations in ROE under the pooled model. 
Table 4-4: Pooled OLS - Company performance measured by ROA 
Variable C  BIND BSIZE CEO 
DUO  
CEO 
TEN 
CEO 
REM 
CO 
SIZE 
LEV F-
stat 
R-Sq 
Coefficient 0.072 -0.038 -
0.0001 
0.050 0.0004 3.73 0.004 -0.107 1.023 0.101 
P-value 0.437 0.653 0.971 0.581 0.8973 0.726 0.728 0.012* 0.423 
 
Note: * indicate significance at 5% level of confidence  
Source: Researcher’s results from e-Views  
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The F-statistics value of 1.02 with corresponding significant p value (0.423) of more than 5% 
indicates that altogether the board characteristics are statistically significant in explaining 
variations in company performance as represented by ROA under the pooled model. The R-
squared figure of 0.101 shows that the board characteristic variables altogether account for 
about 10.1% variation on return on asset in the pooled models. 
 
A significant negative association is present between leverage and return on asset. 
However, board independence, board size, CEO duality, CEO tenure, company size and 
CEO remuneration have a coefficient with a probability figure that is above 5%, meaning that 
they are all insignificant in explaining the variations in return on asset under the pooled 
model. 
Table 4-5: Pooled OLS - Company performance measured by NPM 
Variable C  BIND BSIZE CEO 
DUO  
CEO 
TEN 
CEO 
REM 
CO 
SIZE 
LEV F-
stat 
R-Sq 
Coefficient 0.262 -
0.233 
0.019  
0.069 
 
0.001 
 
-1.890 
0.008 -0.469 2.525 0.2164 
P-value 0.376 0.391 0.274 0.0812 0.905 0.576 0.836 0.0019 0.023 
 
Note: * indicate significance at 5% level of confidence  
Source: Researcher’s results from E-Views  
 
The table above F-statistics value of 2.52 with corresponding significant p value (0.023) of 
less than 5% indicates that altogether the board characteristics are statistically significant in 
explaining variations in company’s performance as represented by NPM under the pooled 
model. The R-squared figure of 0.2164 shows that the board characteristics in sum account 
for about 21.64% variation on net profit margin in the pooled models. 
 
Moreover, a significant negative association exists between leverage and net profit margin. 
However, board independence, CEO remuneration, CEO duality, CEO tenure, company size 
and board size have a coefficient with probability figure that are above 5% meaning that they 
are all insignificant in explaining the variations in net profit margin under the pooled model. 
 
 Fixed effects model 
The model considers differences in the 12 companies tested and allows each dataset 
variable to have its intercept value (Montgomery et al., 2015). As an alternative to the LSDV 
model the fixed effects model was run. This model consents for cross-sectional properties 
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and is time invariant. This model aims to preserve the number of degrees of freedom. It was 
chosen because of its superior functions to the LSDV model (Brooks, 2014). 
Table 4-6: Fixed Effects Model - ROE, ROA and NPM 
Variable coefficients ROE ROA NPM 
Constant  2.7465 -0.1107 3.2196 
Bind 0.2844 -0.0056 -0.5056 
Bsize -0.0207 0.0050 -0.0024 
CEOduo 0.0113 0.0017 -0.0073 
CEOrem 1.1423 2.442* 6.0723 
CEOten 0.0562* -0.0006 0.0521* 
COsize -0.3307*  0.0234 -0.267* 
Leverage -0.5479 -0.2813* -0.126* 
R-squared 0.5514 0.4563 0.5754 
F-statistics  2.5656 1.7516 2.828 
P-value of F statistics 0.0029* 0.0499* 0.0011* 
Note: * indicate significance at 5% level of confidence 
Source: Researcher’s results from E-Views  
 
The F-statistic values of 2.57, 1.75 and 2.83 for ROE, ROA NPM respectively with a p-value 
of less than 5% indicate that the board characteristic variables in sum are substantial in 
clarifying changes in the company performance variables. 
 
Adjusted R-Squared of 55%, 46% and 58% for ROE, ROA and NPM respectively describe 
the percentage changes in company performance that are brought about by the application 
of corporate governance principles as represented by the board characteristics tested. 
 
CEO tenure and company size have a coefficient with p values that are less than 5%, 
meaning that they are all significant in explaining the variations in ROE under the fixed 
effects model. CEO remuneration and leverage have a coefficient with p values that are less 
than 5%, meaning that they are all significant in explaining the variations in ROA under the 
fixed effects model. CEO tenure, leverage and company size have a coefficient with p values 
that are less than 5%, meaning that they are all significant in explaining the variations in 
NPM under this model. 
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 Redundant fixed effects test 
To determine whether the individuality of the 12 companies tested needed to be accounted 
for, the redundant fixed effects test was performed, facilitating the choice for the finest model 
between the pooled regression model and the fixed effects model (Brooks, 2014). The null 
hypothesis was that all the companies were the same and that the pooled regression model 
was the appropriate model. An alternative hypothesis was that the companies are different, 
and the fixed effects model was the appropriate model. The null hypothesis is rejected if the 
probability value of the cross section or the period Chi-square is below 5%.  
▪ ROE: Chi-square was 3.93% which is below 5% and considered significant. 
▪ ROA: Chi-square was 0.27% which is below 5% and considered significant. 
▪ NPM: Chi-square was 0.02% which is below 5% and considered significant.  
 
For all performance measures, the null hypothesis was therefore rejected, meaning that 
heterogeneity in the 12 companies needed to be accounted for over time. That indicates that 
variations in the board characteristics and performance exist among the 12 companies over 
time hence the fixed effects model was chosen over the pooled model.   
 Random effects model 
Table 4-7: Random Effects Model - ROE, ROA and NPM 
Variable coefficients ROE ROA NPM 
Constant  -1.1395* 0.0726 0.1624 
Bind 0.0763 -0.0385 -0.0233 
Bsize 0.0092 -0.0001 0.0192 
CEOduo 0.1851 0.0506 0.0069 
CEOrem -0.5601 0.7302 -1.8900 
CEO Tenure 0.0383* 0.0004 0.0014 
COsize 0.1413* 0.0044 0.0083 
Leverage -0.5829* -0.1077* -0.4696*  
R-square  0.3032 0.1006 0.2164 
F-statistics  3.9795 1.023 2.5259 
P-value of F statistics 0.0011* 0.4234 0.0233* 
Note: * indicate significance at 5% level of confidence 
Source: Researcher’s results from e-Views   
 
The F-statistic values of 3.97 and 2.52 for ROE and NPM respectively with p-value of less 
than 5% indicating that board characteristics are jointly statistically substantial in explaining 
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changes in the company performance variables under the random effects model. Therefore, 
adjusted R-Squared of 30% and 22% for ROE and NPM respectively describes the 
percentage changes in company performance that are brought about by the application of 
corporate governance principles as represented by the board characteristics tested. 
 
However, the ROA F-statistic had a p-value bigger than 5%, signifying that that the board 
characteristic variables were jointly statistically insignificant in explaining changes ROA 
under the random effects model. Only CEO tenure, leverage and company size had a 
coefficient with p values that were less than 5%, meaning that they were all significant in 
explaining the variations in ROE under the random effects model. Only leverage had a 
coefficient with p values that were less than 5%, meaning that they were all significant in 
explaining the variations in NPM under this model. 
 Hausman test 
The Hausman test was conducted to select the most suitable model between the fixed and 
random effects models. The random effects model was preferred as per the null hypothesis 
whilst the alternative hypothesis was that the fixed effects model would be more suitable. 
 
▪ ROE: Chi-square was 16.15% which is greater than 5% and considered insignificant. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis was not rejected hence the random effects model was 
deemed suitable. 
▪ ROA: Chi-square was 2.44% which is below 5% and considered significant. 
▪ NPM: Chi-square was 0% which is below 5% and considered significant.  
▪ However, for ROA and NPM, the null hypothesis was rejected hence the fixed effects 
model was deemed appropriate. 
Two out of the three dependent variables had a significant chi-squared p-value; therefore, 
the null hypothesis was rejected, as was the random effects model. The fixed effects model 
was therefore chosen as the final model. 
 
 Final model (fixed effects model) 
The Hausman test concluded that the fixed effects model was the most suitable. The final 
model included only the significant variables, namely, CEO tenure, company size, CEO 
remuneration and leverage. 
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Table 4-8: Final fixed effects model 
Variable coefficients ROE ROA NPM 
Constant  2.3260 -0.0545 3.561091 
CEOREM 0.1200 0.5205* -0.4005 
CEOTEN 0.0610* -0.0011 0.0472* 
COSIZE -0.2753 0.0202 -0.3478* 
Leverage -0.6782* -0.2555* -0.2363* 
R-square 0.5440 0.4535 0.5634 
F-statistics  3.0427 2.1166 3.2911 
P-value of F 
statistics 
0.0007* 0.0161* 0.0003* 
Note: * indicate significance at 5% level of confidence 
Source: Self-constructed from e-Views  
 
The F-statistic values of 3.04, 2.12 and 3.29 for ROE, ROA NPM respectively, with a p-value 
of less than 5%, indicating that the board characteristics were jointly statistically substantial 
in explaining changes in the company performance variables in this fixed effect final model. 
 
The adjusted R-Squared of 55%, 45% and 56% for ROE, ROA and NPM respectively 
describe the percentage changes in company performance that were brought about by 
application of corporate governance principles as represented by the board characteristics 
tested. These R-Squared values were less than the Durbin-Watson statistics for all 
performance measures, indicating that the fixed effects model was the best final model. 
 
CEO tenure and leverage had a coefficient with p values that were less than 5%, meaning 
that they were all significant in explaining the variations in ROE under the fixed effects final 
model. Holding all other variables constant, a one-unit change in CEO tenure and leverage 
would cause a 6.10% increase in ROE and a 67.8% decrease in ROE. This means an 
increase in leverage would significantly reduce the return to shareholders. Moreover, an 
increase in CEO tenure with the company would slightly increase the return to shareholders. 
 
CEO remuneration and leverage had a coefficient with p values that were less than 5%, 
meaning that they were all significant in explaining the variations in ROA under the fixed 
effects final model. Holding other variables constant, a one-unit change in CEO 
remuneration and leverage would cause a 52% increase in ROA and a 26% decrease in 
ROA. This means an increase in leverage would considerably reduce the return on assets. 
Moreover, an increase in CEO guaranteed remuneration would increase the return on 
assets. 
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CEO tenure, leverage and company size had a coefficient with p values that were less than 
5%, meaning that they were all significant in explaining the variations in NPM under the fixed 
effects final model. Holding all other variables constant, a one-unit change in CEO tenure, 
company size and leverage would cause a 4.72% increase in NPM and a 34.7% and 23.6% 
decrease in NPM. This means an increase in leverage would significantly reduce the net 
profit margin. Moreover, an increase in CEO tenure with the company and an increase in the 
size of the company would increase net profit margin. 
4.3.7 Post-estimation diagnostic tests 
After the panel regression analysis was conducted, several checks were performed to 
confirm the validity of the findings. The probability value of the Jarque-Bera was 10% which 
is above 5% and considered insignificant. The null hypothesis was not rejected, thereby 
indicating that residuals of the random effects model were normally distributed. The random 
effects model also did not have serial correlation, since the Breush-Pagan LM Statistic 
probability value was 11% which is above 5% and considered insignificant, therefore the null 
hypothesis was not rejected. 
 
4.4 CONCLUSION 
The objective of this study was to examine, through empirical evidence, the influence of the 
board of directors’ characteristics on performance of public companies lon the JSE in the 
construction and building materials sector for the period of 2011 to 2016. 
 
The research indicates no significant relationship between board independence, board size 
and CEO duality whilst a direct significant relationship between CEO tenure and CEO 
remuneration and company performance. The research also found a statistically significant 
inverse relationship between leverage and company size and company performance. 
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Chapter 5 Summary, conclusion and recommendations 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In South Africa, corporate governance came to prominence following the promulgation of the 
King I report in 1994 (Smit, 2015). Since then, the boards and managers of South African 
public companies have been following the guidelines as recommended by the successive 
King reports to improve their companies by abiding to corporate governance principles 
(Tshipa et al., 2017). The level of corporate governance awareness and practise in South 
Africa by public companies has considerably improved.  
 
However, the King recommendations have been criticised for promoting a “tick-box 
compliance mentality” (Mans-Kemp & Viviers, 2015:275). Moreover, compliance was time-
consuming and costly to introduce and implement, which in turn could impact on investors’ 
opinions of corporate governance as they may view it as a superfluous overhead that 
hinders the company’s capacity to pursue lucrative prospects that increase investors’ 
returns. 
 
Whilst some investors are mainly worried about whether or not they will achieve a return on 
their investment, others consider investment prospects by taking into account non-financial 
factors like compliance with corporate governance. Investors who look at corporate 
governance compliance are presumably concerned with ‘doing well by doing good’ and not 
merely potential risk and return of an investment (Mans-Kemp & Viviers, 2015). Investors 
with a similar view have the prospect of paying more for investments in well-governed 
organisations as they expect a bigger return. Thus, the question remains whether investors 
could be compensated for investing in companies that are highly governed after considering 
risk and return into account. 
 
The effect of governance compliance and in particular, board characteristics, on company 
performance has remained mixed and inconclusive as per previous literature (refer to 
section 2.8). Therefore, the question is whether corporate governance compliance, and 
particularly board characteristics, is related to the financial performance of South African 
public companies in the construction and building materials sector of the JSE during the 
period 2011 to 2016. 
 
85 
This research is an examination of the relationship between corporate governance board 
characteristics (as represented by independence and size of the board, CEO duality, CEO 
tenure and CEO remuneration) and company performance (as represented by ROA, ROE 
and Net Profit Margin) of JSE listed companies in the construction and building materials 
sector for the period of 2011 to 2016. Corporate governance principles espoused by the third 
King Report were applied to explore the association of board characteristics and 
performance as the timeframe of the study coincided with the period when King III was in 
force. This section summarises the findings, makes recommendations for future studies and 
outlines the study limitations. The contribution of the study is then highlighted, followed by 
the conclusion. 
 
5.2 RESEARCH OVERVIEW 
The research aimed to explore the relationship between board characteristics and 
performance. Public companies on the JSE’s construction and building materials sector 
were sampled for this study. A panel regression instrument was used for the analysis as it 
was deemed best suited for time series data that is cross-sectional. The fixed effects model 
was selected as the final model from three potential models which included the pooled OLS 
model and the random effects model. To ensure validity and accuracy of the final model 
section, the redundancy and the hausman tests were conducted to select the final model.  
 
5.3 DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS 
This section summarises the empirical findings presented in Chapter 4 insofar as they 
address the research question. The findings are then discussed in relation to corporate 
governance theories and previous literature identified in the study. 
 Board independence and financial performance 
No relationship exists between board independence and company performance as 
represented by ROE, ROA and NPM during the period of 2011 to 2016 for the South African 
public companies on the construction and building materials sector of the JSE. This finding is 
similar to those of studies by Zakaria et al. (2014), Johl et al. (2015), Smit (2015), Abdullah, 
(2016), Muchemwa et al. (2016) and Detthamrong et al. (2017).  According to Muchemwa et 
al. (2016), a greater ratio of independent, non-salaried directors is considered by the agency 
theory to reduce agency costs. This would be achieved by board independence acting as a 
tool “to monitor management on behalf of shareholders”, which could enhance company 
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performance (Nuhu & Hussani, 2017:164). On the contrary, however, the findings of this 
research do not support this view. 
 
Similarly, the resource dependence theory views a greater ratio of independent, non-salaried 
directors as a source of resources that contributes to improved company performance.  
However, the findings of this research do not lend credence to this view (Ntim, 2013). 
 
Other possible reasons for the evidence found in this research may exist. It is probable that 
certain constrictions may be present, limiting the enhancement of company performance. 
According to Bhagat and Bolton (2008), directors disclosed as independent in the integrated 
reports may perhaps not be fully independent of the company and its executives. In a similar 
view, Muchemwa et al. (2016) note that these directors may be independent in appearance 
but may not be well acquainted with company activities or they may be incompetent. It is 
also possible that are overly deferring to the CEO and senior executives, which may 
compromise their independence in ‘view’. 
 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) further point out that although a large ratio of non-salaried 
directors is independent, they are likely to be well-known, high-profile figures and as such, 
they would hold directorships of a number of companies. Thus, ‘spreading themselves too 
thin’ could render these directors ineffective in enhancing company performance.  
 
Muchemwa et al. (2016) point to improper director rotation procedures as another possible 
reason for the results found in this research. According to King Report III (2009) “at least a 
third of the non-executive directors should be rotated each year”. The independent directors 
may be ineffective if rotation is not done adequately and effectively so that certain talents, 
skills, knowledge and experience are not adequately retained in the company to enhance 
company performance. In this regard, Bhagat and Bolton (2008) suggest that entrenched 
independent directors who have worked for the company for a lengthy tenure are likely to be 
become lax in their monitoring function, which makes their contribution to company 
performance less effective. 
 
Muchemwa et al. (2016) also contend that when hiring independent, non-salaried directors it 
is necessary to contemplate if the knowledge and experience they hold matches company 
needs and how the benefits that they may bring can be harnessed to increase company 
performance, as hypothesised in the resource dependency view. 
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This research is restricted to the net effects of the relationship between board independence 
– in terms of actual numbers – and company performance. Based on the evidence found, 
additional research exploring the strength of causal effects beyond the net effects is 
recommended. 
 Board size and company performance 
The results show no evidence of a significant relationship between the size of the board and 
company performance. These results concur with those of Van Ness et al. (2010), Wintoki et 
al. (2012) and Detthamrong et al. (2017) who hold the view that the size of the board has no 
relationship with company performance.  
 
The resource dependency theory posits a direct relationship between the size of the board 
and financial performance, proposing that large and diversified boards may provide the 
necessary external resources needed for company sustainability and performance (Meyer & 
De Wet, 2013). However, the findings of this research do not support this view.   
 
Stakeholder theory supports bigger board sizes insofar as this factor drives company value 
creation and enhanced performance through the diversity that comes with larger board sizes 
(Meyer & De Wet, 2013). Thus, stakeholder theory hypothesises a positive relation between 
board size and company performance. In contrast, however, the findings of this research do 
not support the view.  
  
The agency theory views large boards as increasing agency costs, which affects company 
performance. In this view a negative relationship is hypothesised (Meyer & De Wet, 2013). 
However, the findings of this research do not support this view either. 
 
There are possible explanations for these results as per the resource dependency theory 
and agency theory. Larger boards are prone to divisions and alliances which may lead to 
conflict, poor communication, poor coordination and an ineffective supervisory function 
which may result in delay and indecision in emergency situations. Coalition problems can 
lead to CEOs free-riding and dominating the board (Muchemwa et al., 2016). It may also 
create diverse interests among the board which may not coincide with stakeholders’ 
interests, thereby making the board ineffective in enhancing company performance. 
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 CEO duality and financial performance 
The study findings reveal that CEO duality is not significantly related to company 
performance as represented by ROE, ROA and NPM. These results are in line with view 
held by Abbasi et al. (2012), Adekunle and Aghedo (2014), Arora and Sharma (2016), 
Detthamrong et al. (2017) and Ayari and Regaieg (2018) who purport that CEO duality has 
no effect on company performance..  
 
The results of this study are contrary to the agency view which hypothesises a negative 
relationship between CEO duality and company performance. According to agency theory, 
CEO duality weakens the independence of the governing body and may lead to a lack of 
effective oversight. It may also result in the abuse of power when the CEO and the chairman 
of the board is one individual. 
 
The study results are also contrary to the stewardship theory which supports that 
responsibilities of CEO and chairman of the board be occupied by a sole individual. The 
advocates of the stewardship theory argue that “it facilitates monitoring and implementing 
control throughout the company by increasing the speed of decision-making and impacts 
positively on a company’s overall performance” (Nath et al., 2015:108). 
  
In the sample of companies tested in this research, there was only one occasion where the 
responsibilities of the chairman and CEO were occupied by single individual; this finding is 
therefore not conclusive. 
 CEO tenure and financial performance 
This study provides evidence of a direct significant relationship between CEO tenure and 
company performance as represented by ROE and NPM. These results agree with research 
findings by Dikolli et al. (2014) and Cornelli and Karakas (2015) who maintain that CEO 
tenure has a direct significant effect on the performance of the company.  
 
This finding is contrary to the agency theory view that hypothesised a statistically significant 
inverse relationship between CEO tenure and company performance. According to agency 
theory, CEOs engaged by the company for a lengthy period tend to adopt a more 
conventional attitude to risk tolerance so as to diminish overexposure to company-specific 
risk. This is in juxtaposition to their shareholder counterparts who are more concerned with 
maintaining their status quo. Affording CEOs longer tenure gives them substantial freedom 
to entrench their positions and enhances CEO power within the company, consequently 
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leading to pursuit of personal interests that may not necessarily be aligned with those of 
stakeholders (Su & Sauerwald, 2018). Moreover, long tenured CEOs may also affect board 
independence (Conte, 2018).  
 CEO remuneration and financial performance 
This study provides evidence of a direct substantial relationship between CEO guaranteed 
remuneration and performance as represented by ROA. These observations are consistent 
with research by Ismail et al. (2014) in Malaysia and Ndayisaba and Ahmed (2015) in 
Australia, who propose that CEO remuneration has a direct significant relationship with the 
performance of the company. 
 
These results are not, however, consistent with a similar study conducted by Bussin and Nel 
(2015) who investigated South African companies in consumer goods sector. They found a 
significant inverse relationship between ROE and CEO remuneration. According the agency 
view, the findings of Bussin and Nel (2015) may be attributed to managerial power and the 
incapability of remuneration committees to direct an effective remuneration policy that will 
attract, retain and inspire CEOs. The agency theory hypothesised an inverse relationship 
between CEO remuneration and company performance. According to this view, CEOs are 
more likely to prioritise their own remuneration and benefits, even if this is at the expense of 
the company in the long run (Meyer & De Wet, 2013; Pamburai et al., 2015). This leads to 
information asymmetry and conflict of interest, thereby creating agency problems.  
 Leverage and financial performance 
This study observed a significant inverse relationship between leverage and performance as 
represented by ROE, ROA and NPM. Similar results were found by Pamburai et al. (2015). 
 
This indicates that growth in debt will result in a significant reduction in company 
performance. This may be explained by the high interest rates prevalent in South Africa. The 
construction and building materials industry is capital-intensive and the sample companies 
were highly indebted, therefore creating inflexibility in obtaining funding for future operations 
with the possibility of improving performance in addition to the prospect of insolvency costs 
and loss of control by shareholders as debt suppliers may impose restrictive covenants.  
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 Company size and financial performance 
The study observed an inverse significant relationship between the size of the company and 
performance as represented by NPM. This finding suggests that smaller companies are 
performing well than their bigger counterparts.  
 
This study finding is contrary to evidence by Pamburai et al. (2015) in South Africa, who 
found a positive and substantial effect of company size on company performance. The 
findings of this study supports the argument that larger companies may be prone to 
inefficiencies such as poor communication, delayed decision-making and internal conflict 
which may result in poor performance.  
 
5.4 CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY 
This study provides greater insight on how the structure of boards can improve company 
performance through the practice of good corporate governance.     
Specifically, this study: 
▪ Provides valuable information to South African companies listed in the construction 
and building materials sector to identify those board characteristics which have an 
impact on company performance. This will afford an opportunity for the King 
Committee to introduce corporate governance reforms that aim to fill the gaps 
identified in the study to improve company performance. 
▪ Supports the King Committee in improving corporate governance principles to 
eliminate corporate scandals that are crippling economies globally. This is because 
these corporate failures have been attributed to ineffective corporate governance 
structures. 
▪ Reveals the unique characteristics applied by South African companies in their 
governing body structures and the standards they hold which, has the potential to 
improve company performance and attract foreign investors. 
▪ Adds to a pool of existing literature on the subject. This study is expected to assist 
academics with additional insights and recommendations for further research on the 
subject or other related topics. 
 
5.5 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
In existing literature, most studies investigated the influence of corporate governance on 
company performance, in developed markets. Within South African context, there is only 
91 
limited research on this topic and the results of these studies are contradictory. This justifies 
further research such as: 
▪ Qualitative research on intangible characteristics surrounding board structures, as 
recommended by the King Reports. 
▪ Quantitative research among young, growing companies on the stock market and 
their governance structure to see whether they differ from older listed companies. 
▪ A similar study on companies which have not yet been listed on the JSE. 
▪ A similar study across other sectors of the JSE and for a longer period so as to 
ascertain if the effect of board characteristics on company performance can be 
applied to all sectors of the JSE. 
▪ Quantitative research profiling the South African construction industry − through 
surveys to examine the industry board characteristics and determine whether or not 
they meet the principles of the fourth King report.  
The conclusions from outside South Africa may not be comparable to this research and 
other local findings due to differing socio-political and economic circumstances. 
Nonetheless, the findings of this study are still important. 
 
5.6 FINAL REMARKS 
Conclusions from literature review indicates an increase in the evidence suggesting a 
significant relationship between the companies’ practice of good governance and their 
performance. However, there are still reservations as to whether this relationship is due to 
other elements and simply reveals that better countries and better companies have healthier 
performance and improved corporate governance practices. The South African background 
is different from that of other countries. Therefore, additional evidence indicating the 
proficiency of well-managed governance structures in improving company performance is 
vital. 
 
Companies in South Africa are nonetheless encouraged to abide by the recommendations of 
the King IV Report on board structures even though this does not always transform into 
financial benefits but meets the social and community needs of various stakeholders for 
economic growth. Compliance with governance principles is based on the argument that the 
South African construction and building materials sector is critical for the nation’s economic 
growth. Thus, such compliance with corporate governance principles will yield rewards for 
the whole economy. 
  
---o0o--- 
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